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I. INTRODUCTION
Perhaps the most evenly-balanced controversy in all of workers'
compensation law is the question whether a third party in an action by
the employee can get contribution or indemnity from the employer,
when the employer's negligence has caused or contributed to the em-
ployee's injury.' The typical fact situation is that in American District
Telegraph Co. v. Kittleson.2 Kittleson was an employee of Armour &
1. This sentence, first published in 1953 and found now in A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COM-
PENSATION § 76.10 (1982), has been quoted frequently as a preamble to opinions or articles on this
question. See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. Cuban Am. Nickel Co., 396 F.2d 89, 90 (5th Cir. 1968);
Newport Air Park, Inc. v. United States, 293 F. Supp. 809, 816 n.17 (D.R.I. 1968); McDonnell
Aircraft Corp. v. Hartman-Hanks-Walsh Painting Co., 323 S.W.2d 788, 794 (Mo. 1959); Com-
ment, 22 N.A.C.C.A. L.J. 235, 236-37 (1958). The statement is as true now as it ever was.
2. 179 F.2d 946 (8th Cir. 1950), rev'g 81 F. Supp. 25 (N.D. Iowa 1948). The decisional
history of this case is itself representative of the zigzag course the issue has taken over the past
three decades. The federal district court, applying Iowa law, dismissed American's complaint; the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, also applying Iowa law, reversed. Later, in Iowa Power
& Light Co. v. Abild Constr. Co., 259 Iowa 314, 324, 144 N.W. 2d 303, 309 (1966), the state
supreme court held that the Eighth Circuit had been mistaken about Iowa law. Finally, on the
strength of Abild, in Hysell v. Iowa Pub. Serv. Co., 534 F.2d 775 (8th Cir. 1976), the Eighth Circuit
repudiated its own Kittleson decision. .d. at 782-83.
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Company. American District Telegraph had contracted with Armour
to repair a signal system. One of American's employees fell through a
skylight and landed on Kittleson, injuring him severely. Kittleson ac-
cepted workers' compensation from Armour, and also sued American,
as he was entitled to do under the Iowa Act.3 The negligence alleged
was that of American's employee in failing to ascertain whether the
skylight could support his weight. American brought a third-party
complaint against Armour, asserting that the injury was primarily due
to Armour's negligence in allowing the skylight to become so encrusted
with dirt that it was indistinguishable from the roof around it. Armour
moved to dismiss the third-party complaint on the ground that Ar-
mour's compensation liability was exclusive. It is interesting to note
that the compensation liability amounted to $6,800, while the judgment
recovered against American was almost $60,000. The district court dis-
missed the third-party complaint. The circuit court of appeals re-
versed, and held that Armour could be held liable to American for the
damages that American had to pay Armour's employee.4
Each side to this controversy has an argument in its favor which,
considered alone, sounds irresistible. The employer here complains
with considerable cogency that the net result is that $60,000 has been
put in the employee's pocket and has left the employer's pocket because
of a compensable injury, in spite of the plain statement in the act that
the employer's liability for such an injury shall be limited to compensa-
tion payments. 5 Yet if the third party were made to bear the entire
$60,000 damages, he would argue with equal cogency that it is unfair to
subject him, the lesser of two wrongdoers, to a staggering liability
which he would not have had to bear but for the sheer chance that the
other parties involved happened to be under a compensation act. Why
should he, a stranger to the compensation system, subsidize that system
by assuming liabilities that he could normally shift to or share with the
employer?
Because of the closeness of the issue, the number and variety of
attempted solutions, both legislative and judicial, has been nothing
short of breathtaking, and the end is by no means in sight. Even when
deliberate legislative choices have been made, that has not necessarily
been the end of the matter, for more than once the courts have had the
last word by declaring statutes unconstitutional. 6 Indeed, few areas of
3. Kittleson v. American Dist. Tel. Co., 81 F.Supp. 25, 31 (N.D. Iowa 1948), rev'd, 179 F.2d
946 (8th Cir. 1950); see IOWA CODE ANN. § 85.22 (West 1976).
4. 179 F.2d at 954-55.
5. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 85.22 (West 1976).
6. E.g., Ocean Accident & Guar. Corp. v. Poulsen, 244 Wis. 286, 12 N.W.2d 129 (1943).
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law have evoked such daring displays of uninhibited judicial activism,
with centuries-old doctrines being bulldozed out of the way to clear a
path for an "equitable" compromise.
At the time Kittleson was decided, in 1950, while the third-party
problem was a major one in the intellectual sense, it did not loom very
large in the quantitative sense. The reason was that the state of the law
governing the injured employee's possible third-party tort rights had
not developed anything resembling the opportunities that began to ap-
pear a few years later. The employee's case would ordinarily involve
plain negligence by the third party directly contributing to a collision
or other typical industrial accident. But, after all, workers are not in-
jured every day by the falling bodies of telephone repairmen. And so,
while the legal controversy was no less exasperating then than now, the
sheer volume of hardship created was not yet sufficient to touch off the
explosion of remedial efforts that came later.
Two principal developments, each vastly increasing the injured
worker's possible third-party recoveries, and thus equally increasing
the potential for inequity as between third party and employer, account
for the prominence of this problem in the last twenty-five years; first,
the extension of the unseaworthiness doctrine to longshoremen, and
then the upsurge of products liability litigation.
In Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki,7 the Supreme Court held that the
virtual nonfault liability of the ship for unseaworthiness extended to
longshoremen. This holding laid the groundwork for Ryan Stevedoring
Co. v. Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corp. ,8 which dominated this area for
about fifteen years. Here the Supreme Court held that a contract to
perform stevedoring operations implied an agreement with the ship-
owner to perform these services in a workmanlike way, and a further
agreement to indemnify the shipowner for any liabilities he might incur
as a result of failure to live up to this promise.9 Moreover, this duty,
being contractual in nature, was not affected by the exclusive remedy
clause of the compensation act.10 The advent of the Ryan doctrine co-
incided with a vast expansion of the doctrine of unseaworthiness, ex-
tending it, for example, to conditions on dry land. 1 Indeed, at the time
of Ryan, the Supreme Court itself had expanded the concept to include
assault by a fellow worker.12 Since the net result of all this was, in
7. 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
8. 350 U.S 124 (1956).
9. Id. at 133-34.
10. Id. at 132.
11. See, eg., Thompson v. Calmar S.S. Corp., 331 F.2d 657 (3d Cir. 1964).
12. Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 348 U.S. 336 (1955).
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effect, to shift the full burden of the ship's damage liability to the steve-
doring employer, there was mounting complaint that the employer's
supposed immunity to damage liability had been destroyed. The result
was the Congressional abolition in 1972 of both the Sieracki and the
Ryan doctrines, in exchange for a dramatic liberalization of the Long-
shoremen's Act (LHWCA).' 3 But if this was intended to put an end to
controversy in the field, it was far from successful, with the appearance
of multifarious efforts to revive third-party actions against the ship-
owner under some rubric other than unseaworthiness, such as actual
negligence, occupier's liability, and assorted other doctrines. 14
The second-and vigorously continuing-development contribut-
ing to the proliferation of litigation in this field is the expansion of
products liability. Defective machine tools, cranes and scaffolding,
dangerous chemicals, and the like have produced many more third-
party damage awards to employees than were dreamed of twenty years
earlier. This development, in turn, has understandably placed severe
pressure on the classical compensation doctrine that the employer, hav-
ing been relieved of all tort liability to his own employee by the exclu-
sive-remedy clause of the compensation act, cannot be liable to the
third party either for contribution 15 or for noncontractual indemnity. 16
This article surveys the current state of the law on third-party at-
tempts at recovery-over against the employer. It discusses the various
solutions developed in the courts and legislature, and finally suggests
possible compromise to resolve the issue. The cases can best be sorted
out by identifying three possible situations:
The third party seeks a tort-type recovery-over against the em-
ployer (contribution).
The third party seeks a contract-type recovery-over against the
employer (express or implied indemnity); the source of the employer's
relation to the third party is contractual.
The third party seeks a contract-type recovery-over against the
employer (implied indemnity); the relation between the third party and
the employer is not contractual in origin.
13. Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act § 5(b), 33 U.S.C. § 905(b)
(1976), as amendedby Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act Amendments of
1972, Pub. L. No. 92-576, § 18(a), 86 Stat. 1263 [hereinafter referred to as the 1972 Amendments].
14. See notes 184-253 infra and accompanying text.
15. See notes 17-19 infra and accompanying text.
16. See note 267 infra and accompanying text.
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II. CONTRIBUTION: MAJORITY RULE BANNING
The great majority of jurisdictions have held that the employer
whose concurring negligence contributed to the employee's injury can-
not be sued or joined by the third party as a joint tortfeasor, whether
under contribution statutes or at common law. 17 The ground is a sim-
ple one: the employer is not jointly liable' 8 to the employee in tort;
therefore he cannot be a joint tortfeasor.' 9 The liability that rests upon
the employer is an absolute liability irrespective of negligence, and this
is the only kind of liability that can devolve him upon whether he is
negligent or not. The claim of the employee against the employer is
solely for statutory benefits; his claim against the third person is for
damages. The two are different in kind and cannot result in a common
liability.
17. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953); Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling
& Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282 (1952); Dawn v. Essex Conveyors, Inc., 498 F.2d 921 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1040 (1974) (applying Tennessee law); Newport Air Park, Inc. v. United
States, 419 F.2d 342 (Ist Cir. 1969); Murray v. United States, 405 F.2d 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1968)
(applying the Federal Employees' Compensation Act); Maddux v. Cox, 382 F.2d 119 (8th Cir.
1967); Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co. v. Berry Bros. Oilfield Serv., 377 F.2d 511 (5th Cir.
1967); Bertone v. Turco Prods., Inc., 252 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1958); Hill Lines, Inc. v. Pittsburgh
Plate Glass Co., 222 F.2d 854 (10th Cir. 1955); American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Matthews, 182
F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1950); Ham v. Standard Eng'g Co., 416 F.Supp. 1168 (D.S.D. 1976) (applying
South Dakota law); Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 356 So. 2d 1203 (Ala.
1978); Arctic Structures, Inc. v. Wedmore, 605 P.2d 426 (Alaska 1979); Jack Morgan Constr. Co.
v. Larkan, 254 Ark. 838, 496 S.W.2d 431 (1973); Powell v. Interstate Vendaway, Inc., 300 A.2d 241
(Del. 1972); Kamali v. Hawaiian Elec. Co., 54 Hawaii 153, 504 P.2d 861 (1972); Iowa Power &
Light Co. v. Abild Constr. Co., 259 Iowa 314, 144 N.W. 2d 303 (1966); Houk v. Arrow Drilling
Co., 201 Kan. 81, 439 P.2d 146 (1968); Ashland Oil & Ref. Co. v. Bertram & Thacker, 453 S.W.2d
591 (Ky. 1970); Roberts v. American Chain & Cable Co., 259 A.2d 43 (Maine 1969); Baltimore
Transit Co. v. State, 183 Md. 674, 39 A.2d 858 (1944); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Westerlind, 374
Mass. 524,373 N.E.2d 957 (1978); Husted v. Consumers Power Co., 376 Mich. 41, 135 N.W.2d 370
(1965); Cordier v. Stetson-Ross, Inc., 604 P.2d 86 (Mont. 1979); Vangreen v. Interstate Mach. &
Supply Co., 197 Neb. 29, 246 N.W.2d 652 (1976); William H. Field Co. v. Nuroco Woodwork,
Inc., 115 N.H. 632, 348 A.2d 716 (1975); Schweizer v. Elox Div. of Colt Indus., 70 N.J. 280, 359
A.2d 857 (1976); Beal v. Southern Union Gas Co., 62 N.M. 38, 304 P.2d 566 (1956): Hunsucker v.
High Point Bending & Chair Co., 237 N.C. 559,75 S.E.2d 768 (1953); Essick v. City of Lexington,
232 N.C. 200, 60 S.E.2d 106 (1950); Gernand v. Ost Serv. Inc., 298 N.W.2d 500 (N.D. 1980);
Bankers Indem. Ins. Co. v. Cleveland Hardware & Forging Co., 77 Ohio App. 121, 62 N.E.2d 180,
appeal disrm'd, 145 Ohio St. 615, 62 N.E.2d 251 (1945); Halter Concrete Prods., Inc. v. Harris, 592
P.2d 526 (Okla. 1979); Arnold v. Borbonus, 257 Pa. Super. 110, 390 A.2d 271 (1978); Cacchillo v.
H. Leach Mach. Co., 111 R.I. 593, 305 A.2d 541 (1973); Curtis v. Harmon Elec., Inc., 552 P.2d 117
(Utah 1976); Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Wilson, 221 Va. 979, 277 S.E.2d 149 (1981); Seattle
First Nat'l Bank v. Shoreline Concrete Co., 91 Wash.2d 230, 588 P.2d 1308 (1978) (en bane);
Mulder v. Acme-Cleveland Corp., 95 Wis.2d 173, 290 N.W.2d 276 (1980).
18. The accent here is on "liable." Thus, statutes based on the Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act (Uniform Act), define joint tortfeasors as two or more persons "jointly or severally
liable in tort." UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG ToRTFEASoRs AcT § 1, 12 U.L.A. 63 (1955).
19. See, ag., Farren v. New Jersey Turnpike Auth., 31 N.J. Super. 356, 106 A.2d 752 (1954).
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As a legal proposition, this doctrine has stood the test of time, on
the whole, very well. As we shall see, there have been one or two defec-
tions, but usually, when the result of the doctrine has been thought
inequitable, the remedy has taken the form either of ad hoc legislation
or of solutions based on some sort of indemnity concept.
In a number of states in which the doctrine was well established,
the intervening adoption of comparative negligence has been seized
upon as a basis for attempting to change the rule; these attempts have
been consistently unsuccessful.20 There is nothing in the embracing of
comparative negligence that implies any intention to alter the funda-
mental principle of exclusiveness of compensation liability.
III. LIMITED CONTRIBUTION: MINORITY RULE PERMITTING
A. Early Federal Cases.
Except for several contra holdings in federal district courts, 21 the
basic doctrine went unchallenged until the appearance of the Third
Circuit's opinion in Baceile v. Halcyon Lines22 in 1951. The views ex-
pressed in this opinion, although the case itself was reversed by the
Supreme Court,23 are sufficiently stimulating to deserve attention, par-
20. See, eg., General Elevator Corp. v. Champion Papers, 590 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. Civ. App.
1979).
21. See, e.g., The S.S. Samovar, 72 F.Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal. 1947); Rederii v. Jarka Corp., 26
F. Supp. 304 (D. Me. 1939).
22. 187 F.2d 403 (3d Cir. 1951), rev'd sub nonm Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling &
Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282 (1952).
23. Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282 (1952). The actual
ground of the Supreme Court's reversal did not reach the limited contribution issue, which is the
one of interest to workers' compensation law, but rather involved a narrow point of admiralty law.
The Supreme Court ruled that the admiralty doctrine under which mutual wrongdoers share the
damages equally did not extend to noncollision cases such as this one. At the same time, by way
of dictum, the Court cast a cloud over the arbitrary selection of amount of compensation liability
as the amount of contribution liability when it observed that, even if there were a fresh legislative
solution of the problem of contribution in noncollision cases,
there would still be much doubt as to whether application of the rule or the amount of
contribution should be limited by the [Longshoremen's and] Harbor Workers' [Compen-
sation] Act, or should be based on an equal division of damages, or should be relatively
apportioned in accordance with the degree of fault of the parties.
342 U.S. at 286-87.
Sooner or later a case had to come along involving a collision, thus making it impossible to
avoid deciding the contest between the admiralty moiety rule and the compensation exclusive,
liability defense. In Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 597 (1963), the Court held
that the moiety rule in admiralty takes precedence over the exclusive-liability defense under a
compensation act. The moiety rule is in effect taken out of the company of the contribution cases
and assimilated to the Ryan-type of independent-indemnity-duty cases. See text accompanying
notes 8-10 supra. The key factor here is that the moiety obligation, unlike contribution between
tortfeasors generally, is indeed a separate duty based, not on the two wrongdoers' mutual relation
to the plaintiff, but on their relation to each other. This was crisply brought out in the first leading
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ticularly since this was a sincere attempt to work out a sort of compro-
mise to minimize the apparent unfairness of an all-or-nothing
disposition of the recovery-over problem. The court pointed out at
once that the tort liability here was in admiralty, a system which has
developed rules according to its own sense of right, including its dis-
tinctive "moiety rule" applicable to mutual wrongdoers.24 The require-
ment of common liability was not, therefore, quite as sacred in an
admiralty setting as it might be at common law. The court then stated
the heart of its position and its answer to the conventional recovery-
over reasoning summarized above: "While Haenn [the employer] was
responsible to Baccile [the employee] regardless of its fault, Haenn's
negligence in fact brought to fruition his right to compensation. In a
pragmatic sense, therefore, Haenn and Halcyon [the third party] were,
to use the preferable admiralty law description, 'mutual
wrongdoers'."5
It was next stressed that the policy of compensation acts was not to
relieve the employer of all liability, but rather to limit his liability to
the amounts specified in the act. And so the court, pragmatic to the
last, concluded that it would allow the third party a recovery of contri-
bution from the employer, but would limit the amount to the sum
which the employer would have been liable to pay the employee in
compensation.26 The court thus partly avoided the dilemma posed by
the two irreconcilable positions described at the outset, for at least the
third party was not left to bear the entire burden alone.
case to interpret the scope of Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. United States. In United Air Lines, Inc. v.
Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed sub. norn, UnitedAir Lines, Inc. Y. United States,
379 U.S. 951 (1964), as a result of a collision between a military plane and a United Air Lines
plane, compensation was paid by the United States for the deaths of the government employees
aboard the airline's plane under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act. In a third-party suit
against United by representatives of the deceased employees, United sought recovery-over against
the United States. The court held the recovery-over barred, both on the theory of indemnity and
on the theory of contribution, as to which Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. United States had been heavily
relied on by the airline. In distinguishing it, the court said:
The admiralty rule of divided damages is to be distinguished from the rule of in-
demnity urged upon us by United since under admiralty law there arises from a collision
involving mutual fault the right to apportionment of all damages resulting therefrom,
including personal injuries, cargo damage, and damage to ships. The divided damage
rule is based upon the duty which each shipowner owes the other to navigate safely
irrespective of any duty to the person injured.
335 F.2d at 403 (emphasis added).
24. 187 F.2d at 404.
25. Id. at 406.
26. Id
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B. The Former "Pennsylvania Rule".
Pennsylvania at one time had a similar rule, based on a unique
theory of contribution, which held that contribution between joint
tortfeasors under the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act
(Uniform Act) depended not on joint liability but on joint negligence. 27
To put the matter a little more exactly, one may quote Justice Roberts
of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania: "Implicit in these holdings is
the view that the definition of 'joint tortfeasors' does not require that
they have a common liability toward the injured party but only that
their combined conduct be the cause of the injury. ' 28 It will be readily
observed that this rule was in conffict with that described earlier as the
normal rule, based as it is on the fact that the Uniform Act actually
uses the term "jointly . . liable in tort. ' 29 Once the requirement of
joint liability is removed, the employer's defense based on absence of
liability to the employee collapses. Pennsylvania, before abolishing by
a 1974 amendment not only contribution against the employer but im-
plied indemnity as well,30 accordingly produced a series of cases al-
lowing the third-party action over against the employer in
contribution-but it also arbitrarily limited the amount of contribution
to the amount of the employer's compensation liability.31 This former
Pennsylvania rule thus involved not one tour deforce but two. First, to
get contribution at all, the statutory language "liable in tort" had to be
held to mean not liable but guilty of having contributed to a tort. Sec-
ond, to keep the amount of contribution from being open-ended, it had
to be limited to the employer's compensation liability; and, since there
was really no strictly legal rationale requiring this limitation, the limi-
tation had to be arbitrarily imposed for reasons of policy.
This result is exactly what the Third Circuit set out to produce and
27. See Elston v. Indus. Lift Truck Co., 420 Pa. 97, 102 n.2, 216 A.2d 318, 320 n.2 (1966).
28. Id.
29. See note 18 supra.
30. Section 303(b) of the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended in 1974,
provides:
In the event injury or death to an employee is caused by a third party, then such em-ployee, his legal representative, husband or wife, parents, dependents, next of kin, and
anyone otherwise entitled to receive damages by reason thereof, may bring their actiont law against such third party, but the e ployer, his insuranc  carrier, their servants and
agents, employees, representatives acting on their behalf or at their request shall not belable to a third party for damages, contribution or indemnity in any action at law, or
otherwise, unless liability for such damages, contributions or indemnity shall be ex-
pressly provided for in a written contract entered into by the party alleged to be liable
prior to thee gteof the occurrene which gav re to to he action.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 481(b) (Purdon Supp. 1981).
The constitutionality of the amendment was upheld in Tsarnas v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 488 Pa. 513, 412 A.2d 1094 (1980).
31. See, eg., Socha v. Metz, 385 Pa. 632, 123 A.2d 837 (1956).
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did produce in the Baccile case. 32 The Third Circuit got past the no-
contribution problem by applying the admiralty moiety rule, and sur-
mounted the limitation problem by the simple expedient of decreeing
the limitation for practical and policy reasons.3 3 The Supreme Court
reversed on the first point34 and cast doubt on the second, saying that,
even if there were a legislative treatment of the problem, there would
still be a question whether the amount of contribution should be the
amount of compensation, or half, or an amount proportioned to degree
of fault.35
C. The Minnesota Rule in Lambertson.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in the 1977 case Lambertson v.
Cincinnati Corp. ,36 also adopted the result-oriented approach, and con-
cluded that the result most equitable and most consonant with compen-
sation policy was to allow contribution by the employer in proportion
to his fault, but in no event beyond his workers' compensation liabil-
ity.37 Acknowledging that there was no "common liability" of the kind
classically required to support contribution, the court argued that the
employer and third party were nevertheless both liable in their own
way to the employee, that contribution was an equitable doctrine, and
that outworn technical concepts like common liability should not be
allowed to stand in the way of a fair result.38 The result was also con-
sistent with compensation policy, in that the employer's liability re-
mained limited to that allowed under the compensation act.
32. 187 F.2d 403 (3d Cir. 1951), rev'd sub nonz. Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling &
Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282 (1952). See notes 22-26 supra and accompanying text.
33. 187 F.2d at 406.
34. Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282, 285-86 (1952).
35. Id. at 286-87.
36. 312 Minn. 114, 257 N.W.2d 679 (1977). Cincinnati sold a press brake to the plaintiff's
employer. The plaintiff was injured while operating the machine. After recovering workmen's
compensation from his employer, the plaintiff brought a negligence action against Cincinnati. Id.
at 116, 257 N.W.2d at 682. The jury found all parties causally negligent as follows: Plaintiff-
15%; Cincinnati-25%; Employer--60%. Damages of $40,000 were awarded. Judgment was or-
dered against Cincinnati for $34,000, the full amount of the verdict less 15%. Id. at 117, 257
N.W.2d at 683. Cincinnati then sought indemnity or contribution from the employer as a third-
party tortfeasor, which the lower court denied on the authority of Hendrickson v. Minnesota
Power & Light Co., 258 Minn. 368, 104 N.W.2d 843 (1960), overruling Tolbert v. Gerber Indus.
Inc., 255 N.W.2d 362 (Minn. 1977). The supreme court, acknowledging the evenly-balanced con-
troversy surrounding third-party indemnity actions, found no "continuing persuasive force in the
reasoning of the court in Hendrickson." Lambertson, 312 Minn. at 127-28, 257 N.W.2d at 688.
37. Id. at 130, 257 N.W.2d at 689.
38. Id. at 128-30, 257 N.W.2d at 688-89.
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D. The Calfornia and North Carolina Approach.
If it is postulated that the compromise result temporarily achieved
in the Third Circuit by Baccile and in Pennsylvania is desirable, there
is a shortcut that might seem to put all the parties in this same position
with less waste of motion. This is the rule adopted in North Carolina39
and California40 under which, when the employer's negligence contrib-
uted to the injury, the employee's third-party recovery is merely re-
duced by the amount of compensation. Suppose the third-party verdict
is $10,000, and the compensation outlay is $3,000. Under the former
Pennsylvania contribution rule, the employer would pay the employee
$3,000, the third party would pay the employee $10,000, the employee
would pay back the $3,000 to his own employer, and the third party
would recover $3,000 from the employer as contribution. At the end of
the process, the employee would have $10,000, the employer would
have parted with $3,000, and the third party would have paid $7,000.
Under the North Carolina rule, the employee would merely keep the
$3,000, then collect $7,000 from the third person.
This is a judge-made rule, based primarily on the general idea that
no one should profit by his own wrong. In California, the decision was
based also on approval of the results produced by both North Carolina
and Pennsylvania precedents.41 Moreover, since the California decision
involved overruling earlier precedents, the court cited the intervening
legislative abrogation of the noncontribution rule42 as a ground for the
new holding. One reason that had been given for the older rule, deny-
ing any reduction of the third party's liability to the employee when the
employer was negligent, was that the third party at that time could not
have recovered contribution from the employer in any case.43 Of
course, quite apart from the availability or nonavailability of contribu-
tion, the earlier rule could also have been arrived at on the familiar
legal theory that the cause of action is the employee's in any event, and
therefore his full recovery should not be affected by his employer's neg-
ligence.44 However, the intervention of the contribution amendment
39. Hunsucker v. High Point Bending & Chair Co., 237 N.C. 559, 75 S.E.2d 768 (1953). In
North Carolina, the reduction applies when there is an actively negligent employer.
40. Tate v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 213 Cal. App. 2d 238, 28 Cal. Rptr. 548 (1963).
41. Witt v. Jackson, 57 Cal. 2d 57, 366 P.2d 641, 17 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1961). It is significant that
the opinion lumps together the North Carolina and Pennsylvania doctrines, as is in effect done
here, in spite of the different mechanisms involved in reaching a comparable end product. Id. at
71, 366 P.2d at 649, 17 Cal. Rptr. at 377.
42. CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. §§ 875-880 (West 1980).
43. Pacific Indem. Co. v. California Elec. Works, 29 Cal. App. 2d 260, 84 P.2d 793 (1938).
44. See A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §§ 75.21-22 (1982).
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gave California a legal handle with which to steer its rule in what it was
convinced was a more equitable direction.
The California approach was intended to save wasted motion, yet
in practice it did just the opposite, setting off a flood of confusion and
litigation that continues to this day.45 Several courts, including the
Supreme Court of the United States,46 and the supreme courts of New
Jersey47 and Arizona,48 have deliberately declined to emulate Califor-
nia's well-intended effort.
E. The "Murray Credit" Rule.
A quite different legal path to a somewhat different compromise
solution was adumbrated by the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, in a passage which is something more than a dictum
and something less than the ratio decidendi of the case in which it ap-
pears. In Murray v. United States49 the plaintiff employee was injured
in the fall of an elevator, and received compensation under the Federal
Employees' Compensation Act. He then sued the building owner,
Murray, who had leased the building to the United States. Murray
counterclaimed against the United States both for contribution and for
indemnity under the provisions of the lease. Summary judgments dis-
missing both counts were affirmed. 50 As to contribution, Judge
Leventhal emphatically concluded that it was ruled out by the exclu-
sive-remedy principle, since contribution was only possible "when the
tortfeasors have a concurring liability to the same victim." 51 At this
point, however, without any warning that a sensational legal innova-
tion was about to be unveiled, Judge Leventhal said:
Any inequity residing in the denial of contribution against the em-
ployer is mitigated if not eliminated by our rule in Martello v. Hawl-
ey, 112 U.S. App. D.C. 129, 300 F.2d 721 (1962). Martello holds that
where one joint tortfeasor causing injury compromises the claim, the
other tortfeasor, though unable to obtain contribution because the
45. See id. § 75.22 (1982).
46. See Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256 (1979), rev'g 577
F.2d 1153 (4th Cir. 1978). A longshoreman, employed by a stevedoring company, was injured
while working aboard a ship. The longshoreman brought a tort suit alleging negligence by the
shipowner. A jury found that the stevedoring company's negligence contributed 70% of the fault,
the ship's 20%, and the longshoreman's 10%. On rehearing, sitting en banc, the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit adopted a comparative negligence standard and held that the shipowner
could be required to pay only that proportion of the total damages that matched its proportion of
fault. This decision was reversed by the Supreme Court. 443 U.S. at 273.
47. Schweizer v. Elox Div. of Colt Indus., 70 N.J. 280, 359 A.2d 857 (1976).
48. Stroud v. Dorr-Oliver, Inc., 112 Ariz. 403, 542 P.2d 1102 (1975).
49. 405 F.2d 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
50. Id. at 1365.
51. Id.
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settling tortfeasor had "bought his peace," is nonetheless protected
by having his tort judgment reduced by one-half, on the theory that
one-half of the claim was sold by the victim when he executed the
settlement. In our situation if the building owner is held liable the
damages payable should be limited to one-half of the amount of
damages sustained by the plaintiff, assuming the facts would have
entitled the owner to contribution from the employer if the statute
had not interposed a bar. A tortfeasor jointly responsible with an
employer is not compelled to pay the total common law damages.
The common law recovery of the injured employee is thus reduced in
consequence of the employee's compensation act, but that act gave
him assurance of compensation even in the absence of fault.52
This provocative passage deserves close analysis as one more way
of trying to find a compromise between the evenly-balanced interests of
the third party, the employer, and the employee. The analysis should
consider both legal and policy arguments.
On the legal side, the first question is how much decisional force
the quoted paragraph has. It does not decide a point at issue in the case
before the court. On the other hand, it is in a sense more than obiter
dictum, since the court in part justifies the harshness of its main deci-
sion blocking contribution by giving the third party this consolation
prize. At the same time, it cannot be said that this statement was neces-
sary to the decision. The central decision barring contribution could
have been made without it-indeed would have had to be made even
without it, under the reasoning of the court and the authorities cited.
On the whole, then, while the statement is more than dictum, it is not
much more, which is probably just as well, as we shall see presently.
The real legal problem is not even discussed by the court. This is
the question whether a rule designed for covenants not to sue can auto-
matically be assumed to apply to the workmen's compensation prob-
lem. The problem of the joint tortfeasor with an individual defense to
the plaintiff is encountered as to five principal defenses: nonliability
because the injured party is an employee of one of the joint tortfeasors;
nonliability because one of the tortfeasors has given plaintiff a cove-
nant not to sue; nonliability because of personal relationship between
the plaintiff and one of the tortfeasors; nonliability because, as to one
tortfeasor, the plaintiff had assumed the risk; and nonliability of one
tortfeasor because as to him the statute of limitations has run or the
52. Id. at 1365-66 (footnotes omitted). The Marello rule is not accepted by the UNIF. CON-
TRIBUTION AMONG TORTEEASORs AcT § 4, 9 U.L.A. 111, 118-19 (Supp. 1963). It has, however,
been adopted in New Jersey, Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 17 N.J. 67, 110 A.2d 24 (1954),
and in Texas, Palestine Contractors, Inc. v. Perkins, 386 S.W.2d 764 ('rex. 1964). See also, Note,
Contribution .4mong Joint Tort/easors *hen One Tor/feasor Enjoys a Special Defense Against Ac-
tion by the Injured Party, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 407 (1967).
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period for giving notice of injury has expired.53 A mere glance at the
list is enough to reveal that the competing interests and legal considera-
tions vary sharply from one category to another, and it can by no
means be assumed that a solution suitable to one category should or
will be adopted for the others.54 For example, Louisiana has decided
that a tortfeasor protected from direct suit by the plaintiff as a result of
interspousal immunity may be held liable for contribution,55 but that a
tortfeasor shielded by the exclusive-remedy defense of workmen's com-
pensation may not be.5 6 There are many differences between the com-
pensation category and the covenant-not-to-sue category. They do
have one thing in common, as the author pointed out in an article pub-
lished in 1940: in these two categories the plaintiff gets something from
the immunized tortfeasor; in the others he does not.57 But there the
resemblance ends. The chief difference is that the plaintiff giving a
covenant not to sue is making a voluntary choice. He can do it or not
do it, and he can control the circumstances under which it is done; if he
does not like the legal consequences he can protect himself by merely
refraining from giving the covenant. The employee in the Murray case
had no such option. His third-party recovery is cut down by the court's
act, not by his act. This distinction goes to the heart of what is proba-
bly the primary reason for the Martello -type rule. Mr. Justice Brennan
stressed it when, as a Justice of the Supreme Court of New Jersey, he
wrote the opinion in the leading case establishing the rule in New
Jersey: "if the injured party is required to credit only the amount re-
ceived in settlement . . . he may be tempted to make collusive settle-
ments .... "58 And Judge Bastian in Martello, referring to the
decision about to be reversed, said, as his first argument: "We think the
holding of the Municipal Court of Appeals would leave the door too
far open to fraud and collusion." 59 Plainly, this rationale for the Mar-
tello rule has little relevance to the situation in the Murray case. The
employee has no choice whether his injury should be under the com-
pensation act, and his employer's liability under that act is fixed by law.
53. See Larson, A Problem in Contribution: The Tortfeasor With an Individual Defense
4gainst the Injured Party, 1940 Wis. L. REv. 467, 467-68 (1940). See also, Note, Contribution
Among Joint Tortfeasors "en One Torifeasor Enjoys a Special Defense Against Action by the
Injured Party, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 407 (1967).
54. See instances cited in Larson, supra note 53 and Note, supra note 53, at 408-12, where a
jurisdiction's holdings vary depending on the category.
55. Smith v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 247 La. 695, 174 So.2d 122 (1965).
56. P lmer v. Willemet-Stouse Elec. Co., 183 So.2d 373 (La. App. 1966), cert. denied, 249 La.
67, 184 So.2d 736 (1966).
57. See LARSON, supra note 53.
58. Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 17 N.J. 67, 92, 110 A.2d 24, 36 (1954).
59. Martello v. Hawley, 300 F.2d 721, 723 (D.D.C. 1962).
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Another obvious dissimilarity between the covenent-not-to-sue situa-
tion and exclusive-remedy problem is that the plaintiff in the former is
allowed to keep the proceeds both of his settlement and of his damage
recovery, while in the latter he must restore so much of the damage
recovery to his employer as represents the compensation outlay. As-
sume the total damages are $20,000, and the plaintiff settles with the
first tortfeasor for $9,000. His recovery against the second tortfeasor
under Martello would be $10,000. Thus, he would have and retain
$19,000. But, if the plaintiff had received $9,000 in workmen's com-
pensation under Murray, the employee would have to pay $9,000 over
to the employer out of his $10,000 recovery, leaving him with a total
recovery of compensation plus damages of only $10,000.
On the practical and policy side, the prime defect of the Murray
result is that there is no rational relation between the fifty percent re-
duction in plaintiff's recovery and the interests of either the employee
or the employer. Let us go back to the facts of the Kittleson case60 with
which this article opened. The compensation liability there was $6,800
and the third-party recovery was $60,000. If this situation were to arise
under the Murray case, the plaintiff, instead of recovering $60,000 and
reimbursing the employer for $6,800, thus retaining $53,200, would re-
cover only $30,000 from the third party, plus his $6,800 compensation,
for a total of $36,800-in spite of the fact that at the trial he must be
assumed to have established actual damages of $60,000. By what con-
ceivable logic can he be told that he should absorb a loss of $16,400 for
the benefit of the third-party tortfeasor? A rule capable of producing
such a result is clearly unacceptable, particularly since its legal under-
pinnings are just as unsound as its practical result, and it is accordingly
not surprising that the "Murray credit" rule, although frequently in-
voked, has attracted no further acceptance. 61
F. The New York Rule in Dole.
In 1972 the New York Court of Appeals, in Dole v. Dow Chemical
Co. ,62 held that the third-party defendant in a suit by the employee's
widow could implead the employer, who was partially responsible for
the employee's death, and recover from the employer an amount pro-
portionate to the employer's share of fault. Since, for purposes of the
exclusive-remedy clause, the court treated this as a case of indemnity
60. See notes 2-4 supra and accompanying text.
61. See Arcell v. Ashland Chem. Co., 152 NJ. Super. 471, 378 A.2d 53 (1977). See also
Dodge v. Mitsui Shintaku Ginko K.K. Tokyo, 528 F.2d 669 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
944 (1976).
62. 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972).
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rather than contribution, a detailed analysis of this landmark decision
must be reserved for inclusion in the discussion of implied indemnity
growing out of a tort situation.63 But at this point it must be noted that,
for all the court's repeated references to "indemnity," it has in effect
revolutionized the sharing of damages between joint wrongdoers in
New York. Previously, New York had employed the "active-passive"
negligence test in deciding when indemnification would be allowed,"
had found an implied contract in favor of the wrongdoers who had
been passively negligent and against the actively negligent wrongdo-
ers,65 and had asserted that this was something different from contribu-
tion. Now there appears to be an implied contract of indemnity in
favor of any tortfeasor by any other tortfeasor, whatever their degrees
of responsibility. It is difficult to see what remains to be handled under
the regular contribution statute66 apportioning damages equally be-
tween joint tortfeasors. In other words, Dole strikes two resounding
blows in favor of flexibility. First, it replaces contribution, and its rigid
pro rata rule on sharing liability, with indemnity, at least in any case in
which a party has insisted on having indemnity determined in the judg-
ment. Second, it replaces the previous all-or-nothing outcome in in-
demnity with proportionate-responsibility sharing.
A discussion of the issue of tort law in this decision is out of place
here. Accepting this tort law tour deforce as an accomplished fact, and
reserving the question of the compensation law exclusive-remedy is-
sue,67 one may at this point merely note how, in a typical case, the Dole
rule attempts to achieve a rough equity among the parties. Suppose the
total damages were $20,000, and suppose claimant has received $9,000
in workmen's compensation. The third party, let us assume, was 40%
responsible for the loss, and the employer 60%. The employee would
recover his full $20,000 from the third party in the tort suit. Out of this,
the third party would eventually pay only $8,000, which is calculated in
relation to his fault. The employer would pay $12,000, which is also
calculated in relation to his fault. But in New York, fault or no fault,
the employer would have a right to reimbursement of his compensation
outlay from the proceeds of the third-party suit, and so he would get
back $9,000 from the employee. This prevents a double recovery by
the employee, who is now left with $20,000, the exact amount of his
loss. The employer has finally paid a total of $12,000, which is a little
63. See text accompanying notes 280-84 infra.
64. See McFall v. Compagnie Maritime Belge, 304 N.Y. 314, 107 N.E.2d 463 (1952).
65. Id. at 328, 107 N.E.2d at 471.
66. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 1401 (McKinney 1976).
67. See text accompanying notes 285-87 infra.
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more than he would have paid under a cast-iron exclusiveness rule, but
much less than he would have paid out if his 60% negligence had been
called the "active" and "primary" negligence, saddling him with the
entire tort liability under the old rule.
G. The Illinois Rule in Skinner and the 1979 Amendment.
It remained for the Supreme Court of Illinois, in Skinner v. Reed-
Prentice Division Package Machinery Co. ,68 to go all the way in demol-
ishing the familiar no-contribution rule, by decreeing contribution, as
contribution and not as indemnity, in proportion to fault, and without
limitation to the amount of compensation liability.69 Thus, it outdid
both Minnesota's Lambertson70 and New York's Dole.71 Lambertson
was just as uninhibited in scrapping the conventional rule requiring
common liability before there could be contribution, but it was more
limited in that the ceiling on the employer's liability was the amount of
compensation. 72 Dole was just as unlimited as Skinner in this latter
respect, in that no ceiling was imposed, but was less spectacular in that,
by using the indemnity vehicle, it did not have to shatter the common
liability contribution doctrine, at least by name.73
Shortly after Skinner, the Illinois legislature adopted a general
statute on contribution among joint tortfeasors.74 It makes no refer-
ence to the Skinner problem, but its language clearly does not support
contribution on the Skinner facts. It authorizes contribution "where 2
or more persons are subject to liability in tort arising out of the same
injury. ... ,,75 Moreover, it is no coincidence that, although the effec-
68. 70 1ll.2d 1, 374 N.E.2d 437, cert. denied, 436 U.S. 946 (1978). The claimant brought a
strict liability action for damages against the manufacturer of the machine on which she was
injured. Although the claimant was barred from bringing such an action against her employer, the
manufacturer filed a third-party complaint seeking contribution from that employer, based on
misuse of the product. In a significant reworking of Illinois law, the court held that the third-party
action was maintainable and that contribution from the employer in proportion to his relative
degree of fault was proper. The court said that, although the complaint was cast in terms of
negligence, it alleged misuse of the product and assumption of risk by the employer. Since an
action over the indemnity would lie, under Miller v. De Witt, 37 ll.2d 273, 226 N.E.2d 630 (1967),
the court saw no reason why contribution should not also be available. 70 IlM. 2d at 16, 374 N.E.2d
at 443.
69. Id.
70. 312 Minn. 114, 257 N.W.2d 679 (1977).
71. 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972).
72. 312 Minn. 114, 257 N.W.2d 679 (1977).
73. 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972).
74. An Act in Relation to Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors, ILL. REv. STAT. Ch. 70,
§ 302 (1979). The right is only in favor of a tortfeasor who has paid more than his pro rata share,
and is limited to the amount he has paid in excess of his pro rata share.
75. Id. (emphasis added).
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tive date of the amendment was September 14, 1979, it was made appli-
cable to causes of action arising on or after March 1, 1978-the exact
date of the Skinner decision.76
The amendment, of course, affects recovery-over only in the form
of contribution. The remedy in the form of indemnity77 remains.
A post-amendment appellate division case, Marchi v. Indiana Har-
bor Belt R. Co. ,78 is a reminder that a version of active-passive or pri-
mary-secondary negligence indemnification is still alive in Illinois,
although there must be a qualitative difference between the negligence
of the parties.
We will return at the end of the article to an overall analysis of the
relative merits of the many ingenious solutions that have been essayed,
in the never-ending effort to strike the best balance in compensation's
most evenly-balanced controversy. But first it is necessary to examine
the second major category of such solutions, those centering on the
concept of indemnity rather than contribution, where developments
have been, if anything, even more dramatic and varied.
IV. INDEMNITY: ExPREss CONTRACT
A. Normal Rule. Express Indemnity Not Barred
The third party may recover over against the employer whenever it
can be said that the employer breached an independent duty toward
the third party and thus acquired an obligation to indemnify the third
party.
The clearest exception to the exclusive-liability clause is the third
party's right to enforce an express contract in which the employer
agrees to indemnify the third party for the very kind of loss that the
third party has been made to pay to the employee. 79 A familiar exam-
76. Id.
77. Miller v. De Witt, 37 Ill.2d 273, 226 N.E.2d 630 (1967).
78. 83 Ill. App. 3d 1005, 404 N.E.2d 938 (1980).
79. See Olsen v. Shell Oil Co., 595 F.2d 1099 (5th Cir.), ceri. denied, 444 U.S. 979 (1979);
Porello v. United States, 153 F.2d 605 (2d Cir. 1946), ardinpart, rey'dinparl, remanded sub not
American Stevedores, Inc. v. Porello, 330 U.S. 446 (1947); American Radiator & Standard Sani-
tary Corp. v. Mark Eng'g Co., 230 Md. 584, 187 A.2d 864 (1963); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wester-
lind, 374 Mass. 524, 373 N.E.2d 957 (1978); Keefer v. Al Johnson Constr. Co., 292 Minn. 91, 193
N.W.2d 305 (1971); De Shaw v. Johnson, 155 Mont. 355, 472 P.2d 298 (1970); City of Artesia v.
Carter, 94 N.M. 311, 610 P.2d 198 (express contract of indemnity by a government body is not
against public policy, and hence a government employer can be held to such a contract, although
it has also paid workers' compensation), cer. denied, 614 P.2d 545 (1980); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Rota-
Cone Field Operating Co., 84 N.M. 483, 505 P.2d 78 (Ct. App. 1972); Western Union Tel. Co. v.
Cochran, 302 N.Y. 545, 99 N.E.2d 882, 102 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1951); Gibbs v. Carolina Power & Light
Co., 265 N.C. 459, 144 S.E.2d 393 (1965); Republic Steel Corp. v. Glaros, 12 Ohio App. 2d 29, 230
N.E.2d 667 (1967); Gordon H. Ball, Inc. v. Oregon Erecting Co., 273 Or. 179, 539 P.2d 1059
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ple is the situation in which an employee is injured because of the con-
dition of the premises, and recovers from the landlord who leased the
premises to the employer; if the landlord in the lease has exacted a
covenant from the employer to hold the landlord harmless in the event
of such claims, the enforcement of this covenant does not violate the
exclusive-remedy provision of the compensation act.80 Another increas-
ingly familiar example is the hold-harmless agreement assumed by a
contractor doing work for a city8'1 or other owner,82 or by a subcontrac-
tor for the benefit of the general contractor.8 3 Indeed, with everyone
trying to protect himself by such agreements, one may even encounter
them in a series, along which liability travels until it settles upon the
ultimate indemnitor. In Hardman v. Ford Motor Co. 84 a subcontrac-
tor's employee was injured when the ladder on which he was standing
slipped on a highly waxed floor. The contractor had furnished the lad-
der and was found negligent in not securing the ladder. The building
owner was found negligent in not warning the employee of the highly
polished surface. The subcontractor's employee successfully sued the
contractor and the building owner. The owner cross-claimed against
the general contractor on an indemnification agreement. The general
contractor similarly filed a third-party complaint against the subcon-
tractor for indemnification. The end result was that the injured em-
ployee's employer was held responsible for the judgment.
B. The Minority,4labama Rule.
It is characteristic of compensation law that, however one-sided a
majority rule may be, it is almost never completely unanimous-and
the rule here under consideration is no exception, thanks to the 1978
Alabama holding in Paul Krebs & Associates v. Matthews & Fritts Con-
struction Co. 8 5 that even an express indemnity contract will not be en-
forced against the employer.8 6
The court's departure from the mainstream of workmen's compen-
sation decisions began in 1976 with Gunter v. United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Co. 8 7 That decision denied enforcement of an express in-
(1975); Redford v. City of Seattle, 94 Wash. 2d 198, 615 P.2d 1285 (1980); Young v. Anaconda
Am. Brass Co., 43 Wis. 2d 36, 168 N.W.2d 112 (1969).
80. See Clements v. Rockefeller, 189 Misc. 889, 70 N.Y.S.2d 146 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1947).
81. See, e.g., Yearicks v. City of Wildwood, 23 N.J. Super. 379, 92 A.2d 873 (1952).
82. See, eg., Republic Steel Corp. v. Glaros, 12 Ohio App. 2d 29, 230 N.E.2d 667 (1967).
83. See, eg., Gordon H. Ball, Inc. v. Oregon Erecting Co., 273 Or. 179, 539 P.2d 1059 (1975).
84. 70 N.J. Super. 275, 175 A.2d 455 (1961).
85. 356 So.2d 638 (Ala. 1978).
86. Id. at 640.
87. 340 So.2d 749 (Ala. 1977).
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demnity agreement against an employer when the third-party
tortfeasor who sought to enforce the agreement was charged with active
negligence. That decision was reaffirmed in Robins Engineering, Inc. v.
Cockrell,"8 which held that evidence of such an agreement was inad-
missible in litigation by the employee against the third party. After
these decisions, it seemed possible that the thrust of the court's holding
would be limited to instances in which the third party was charged with
active, rather than passive, negligence. However, the court's aberra-
tional decisions reached their ultimate expression in Paul Krebs. In
that case, the court interpreted the Alabama Workmen's Compensation
Act 89 to forbid a third-party tortfeasor from recovering from an em-
ployer, even under an express contract of indemnity, for injury to an
employee covered by the Act.90 Although the Paul Krebs case also
dealt with facts evidencing active negligence by the third party,91 its
holding is worded so generally that it seems to invalidate any indem-
nity contract, even if the third party were only passively or secondarily
negligent. As authority for its holding, the court cited a lower appellate
court case from New Mexico, Gulf Oil Corp. v. Rota-Cone Field Opera-
tion Co.92 Even before Paul Krebs, the Gulf Oil decision had been spe-
cifically repudiated by at least two state supreme courts.93 Then in
1980 it was repudiated by New Mexico itself.94 Thus the Supreme
Court of Alabama now stands completely alone on this issue.
There are two principal grounds on which the validity of the ex-
press-indemnity exception has been attacked. The first, which suc-
ceeded in Alabama, is based on a literal interpretation of the
exclusiveness clause, as being unqualified in its phrasing and therefore
allowing no exceptions whatsoever. Outside of Alabama, this reading
has generally been rejected.95 Public policy provides the other ground
for attack. This rationale, that allowing third parties to escape contrac-
tually the consequences of their own wrongdoing offends sound public
policy, has also been rejected in the reported cases in which it was
attempted.96
88. 354 So.2d 1 (Ala. 1977).
89. ALA. CODE § 25-5-53 (1975).
90. 356 So.2d at 640.
91. Id. at 639.
92. 84 N.M. 483, 505 P.2d 78 (1972).
93. Manson-Osberg Co. v. State, 552 P.2d 654 (Alaska 1976); Gordon H. Ball, Inc. v. Oregon
Erecting Co., 273 Or. 179, 539 P.2d 1059 (1975).
94. City of Artesia v. Carter, 94 N.M. 311, 610 P.2d 198 (Ct. App. 1980).
95. See, e.g., Republic Steel Corp. v. Glaros, 12 Ohio App. 2d 29, 230 N.E.2d 667 (1967).
96. See Olsen v. Shell Oil Co., 595 F.2d 1099 (5th Cir. 1979); Republic Steel Corp. v. Glaros,
12 Ohio App. 2d 29, 230 N.E.2d 667 (1967).
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C. Spec.ifc Statutory. Treatment of Express Indemnity.
Several state statutes, including those of California,97 North Caro-
lina,98 Pennsylvania,99 and Texas, ° specifically provide that there
shall be no right of recovery-over against the employer by a third per-
son, whether by indemnity or contribution, in the absence of a written
agreement entered into before the injury. Obviously, such a statute
places the validity of the express-indemnity exception beyond question,
and North Carolina has so held.' 0 ' As to the scope of the provision,
California has taken the position that the provision rules out all non-
express theories of liability over, whether related to implied contract or
to equitable considerations based on tort.'0 2 As to constitutionality, it
has already been noted that the Pennsylvania statute survived constitu-
tional attack.'03 But the Minnesota version was struck down, princi-
pally because it was too broad, and because it deprived the third person
of a common-law right of action without putting a reasonable substi-
tute in its place."l4
Express statutory treatment may also take the form, not of author-
izing the express-indemnity exception, but of forbidding it, in whole or
in part. An example of forbidding it wholly may be the sweeping Ne-
vada provision stating: "No contract of employment, insurance, relief
benefit, indemnity, or any other device, shall modify, change or waive
any liability created by this chapter."' 05 Whether or not the authors of
this passage had the present problem in mind, the Supreme Court of
Nevada has indicated in a dictum that an express contract of indemnity
given by the employer would be void."°0 An example of a partial ban
of express indemnity contracts is contained in the 1972 Longshore-
97. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3864 (West 1971). See Arbaugh v. Procter & Gamble Mfg., 80 Cal.
App. 3d 500, 506, 145 Cal. Rptr. 608, 613 (1978).
98. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-10.2(e) (1979). See Gibbs v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 265
N.C. 459, 466-67, 144 S.E.2d 393, 399-400 (1965).
99. PA. STAT. ANN. ti. 77, § 481(b) (Purdon Supp. 1981-1982). See Bell v. Koppers Co., 481
Pa. 454, 457, 392 A.2d 1380, 1382 (1978).
100. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 3 (Vernon 1966). See Ealand v. Gulf, C. &
S.F.Ry., 411 S.W.2d 591, 593 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
101. Gibbs v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 265 N.C. 459, 466-67, 144 S.E.2d 393, 399-400
(1965).
102. San Francisco Examiner Div., Hearst Pub. v. Sweat, 248 Cal. App. 2d 493, 496-97, 56
Cal. Rptr. 711, 713-14 (1967).
103. Tsamas v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 488 Pa. 513, 521,412 A.2d 1094, 1096-99 (1980).
See note 30 supra for the text of the statute.
104. Carlson v. Smogard, 298 Minn. 362, 367-69, 215 N.W.2d 615, 618-20 (1974).
105. NEy. REV. STAT. § 616.265 (1979). The section goes on to say that all such devices are
void.
106. Carrao Constr. Co. v. Curtis, 94 Nev. 569, 571, 584 P.2d 1303, 1304 (1978).
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men's Amendments. 0 7 The principal purpose of the amendments, of
course, was to obliterate the type of implied indemnity that had been
created by Ryan, 0 8 but for good measure the amendment stated that
"any agreements or warranties to the contrary shall be void"' 0 9 -
which is plainly broad enough to cover express contracts. But the
amendment covers only agreements between the stevedoring employer
and the vessel. Accordingly, it has no effect on agreements between the
employer and third parties other than the ship, such as an oil com-
pany," 0 a grain elevator," or a scaffolding erector." 2
D. . Employer Not Joinable as Indemnitor.
Since the indemnity claim is by definition a separate legal cause,
and, unlike the employer's contributory negligence, is not intertwined
with the tortious incident itself, every precaution should be taken to see
that the employee's own third-party rights are not prejudiced by the
injection of this factor into his case. To this end, North Carolina has
held that, under an express contract of indemnity running from plain-
tiff's employer to the third party, the third party cannot insist that the
employer and the employer's insurer be joined in the plaintiff's action
for purposes of enforcement of the right of indemnity. "3 Plaintiff was
employed by the construction company, which was doing work for the
power company, and was injured by the negligence of an employee of
the power company. He received workmen's compensation benefits
and then sued the third-party power company.1 4 In this suit, the
plaintiff was held entitled to have his cause tried without being encum-
bered by these additional parties and issues not germane to his cause of
action. The court said: "There is not that community of action in these
various causes of action which will permit them to be litigated in plain-
tiff's action.""15
107. 1972 Amendments, supra note 13.
108. See notes 8-12 supra and accompanying text.
109. 1972 Amendments, supra note 13.
110. Crutchfield v. Atlas Offshore Boat Serv., 403 F. Supp. 920 (E.D. La. 1975).
111. Gould v. General Mills, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 1181 (W.D.N.Y. 1976).
112. Nieves v. Douglas S.S., Ltd., 451 F. Supp. 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
113. Gibbs v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 265 N.C. 459, 144 S.E.2d 393 (1965).
114. Id. at 460, 144 S.E.2d at 395.
115. Id. at 469, 144 S.E.2d at 401. An interesting feature of this case is that the same insurance
carrier that insured the construction company's compensation liability to the plaintiff also insured
the construction company's liability to the third party under the indemnity contract. This pro-
vides an illustration of the complications that are increasingly becoming apparent as insurance
companies turn up on different and conflicting sides of the same issue. For example, in this in-
stance, the same insurance company was being asked to help actively defend against plaintiffs
suit, in its capacity as insurer of the indemnity agreement (which explicitly imposed that obliga-
tion on the carrier), while it was also the carrier that would attempt to assert a right to be reim-
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E. Indemnity Agreement Not a Third-Party Defense.
Afortiori, the third-party tortfeasor cannot defend on the ground
that the employee's employer has contracted to indemnify defendant,
and will thus have to pay both workmen's compensation and tort dam-
ages." 16 If the employer wants to make that kind of contract, that is his
affair; the employee's rights, however, cannot be affected by such an
agreement." 17 Moreover, having made this kind of agreement, the em-
ployer cannot then undo its effect and pass the burden back to the em-
ployee by piling yet another agreement on this relation-an agreement
by the employee that he will not exercise his rights against the third
party as to liabilities that the employer has indemnified. Since the stat-
utes themselves cast ultimate liability on the third party," 8 a contrac-
tual provision in the employment contract that in this situation the
employee's exclusive remedy shall be workmen's compensation is void.
An attempt to enforce such a provision through an injunction against
further prosecution at law by the employee of his rights against the
third-party indemnitee was struck down by the Court of Appeals of
New York." 9
V. INDEMNITY GROWING OUT OF SEPARATE DUTY BASED ON
RELATIONSHIP
If the third party and employer stand in a special legal relationship
that carries with it the obligation of the employer to indemnify the
bursed out of the proceeds of the very action it was asked to help resist. This kind of tangle is at
least partly avoided by the decision in this case, which sees to it that the first step in the process,
the action by the employee plaintiff himself, goes forward without the complicating presence of
the parties and issues involved in the indemnity problem.
The problem cannot always be this easily sidestepped, however. Suppose the carrier insuring
the indemnity obligation seeks to exercise its statutory right as subrogated carrier on the compen-
sation risk to intervene in the employee's third-party suit? This question arose in Michigan. See
Harrison v. Ford Motor Co., 370 Mich. 683, 122 N.W.2d 680 (1963). The court held that the
carrier would not be allowed to intervene, on the theory that the carrier would be merely suing to
collect that which it would have to pay under the indemnification coverage. The flaw in this
reasoning is that it takes as already established the employer's negligence. Since the insurer only
insured the employer's agreement to indemnify the third party if the third party was held liable to
the employer's employees for injuries caused by the negligence of the employer-a typical insur-
ance of indemnification agreement--the carrier would have an interest in proving that the em-
ployer had not in fact negligently contributed to the employee's injuries. If it could succeed in
this, it would not be suing itself since it would have no liability as insurer of the indemnity.
116. Umnus v. Wisconsin Pub. Serv. Corp., 260 Wis. 433, 51 N.W.2d 42 (1952).
117. Id. at 441-42, 51 N.W.2d at 47.
118. See CAL LAB. CODE § 3864 (West 1971); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-10.2(e) (1979); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 77, § 481(b) (Purdon Supp. 1981-1982); Tax. REV. Crw. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 3
(Vernon 1966).
119. Western Union TeL Co. v. Cochran, 302 N.Y. 545, 99 N.E.2d 882 (1951).
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third party, this relational right of indemnity may be enforced without
offending the exclusive-remedy clause. Such a relationship is that of a
bailee to a bailor. In a leading California case,' 20 the employer, driving
a car belonging to the third party, ran into his own employee. The
employee sued the third party as owner of the car, under an owner's
liability statute.'21 The third party then claimed the right of reimburse-
ment from the employer, whose negligence was the actual cause of the
injury. It was held that the bailee of an automobile had a separate
obligation to hold the bailor harmless from damage arising out of
the bailment, and this obligation extended to indemnification for
imposition of third-party liability on the owner in the present
circumstances.' 22
This type of case usually presents, in addition to the special legal
relations flowing from the concept of bailment, an extreme contrast be-
tween genuine negligence in one party and the most technical and con-
structive sort of imputed negligence in the other. This contrast, rather
than the specific implications of bailment, was stressed in a somewhat
similar Minnesota case, Lunderberg v. Bierman. 23 Mrs. Bierman had
taken her newly-purchased automobile back to the dealer for a 2,000
mile check-up provided for by the contract of purchase. As part of the
check-up, Ilstrup and Elder Lunderberg, two employees of the dealer,
took the car out for a road test, and Elder Lunderberg was injured as a
result of Ilstrup's operation of the car. Elder collected workmen's com-
pensation, and then sued Ilstrup, and also Mrs. Bierman as the owner
with whose permission the car was being operated,124 under the Minne-
sota statute imposing such liability on motor vehicle owners. 2 5 Mrs.
Bierman was allowed to implead the dealer, and was granted summary
judgment against him on the ground that he was liable to indemnify
Mrs. Bierman for any recovery by Elder Lunderberg against her. 26
The Supreme Court of Minnesota affirmed. 2 7 The court relied not
only on Baugh v. Rogers,'28 but on several cases in which there was a
similar disparity between the relatively minor or technical fault of the
120. Baugh v. Rogers, 24 Cal. 2d 200, 148 P.2d 633 (1944).
121. Id at 204, 148 P.2d at 636.
122. Id. at 214-16, 148 P.2d at 641-42.
123. 241 Minn. 349, 63 N.W.2d 355 (1954).
124. Id. at 351, 63 N.W.2d at 357.
125. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 170.54 (West 1960).
126. 241 Minn. at 351, 63 N.W.2d at 357-58.
127. Id at 349, 63 N.W.2d at 355.
128. 24 Cal. 2d 200, 148 P.2d 633 (1944).
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third party and the active or primary negligence of the employer. 129
The ground of the decision, then, is not the narrow one of the specific
obligation of a bailee to hold a bailor harmless, but is the broader prin-
ciple stated as follows by the court:
[The impleaded defendant is liable] where, as here, the parties are
not in pan delicto, but, instead, the injury arises out of a duty which
one owes to the other so that as between themselves the act or omis-
sion of one is the primary cause of the injury and liability exists as to'
the other only by virtue of a law imposing such liability. 130
It is interesting that the Minnesota Supreme Court, in later hold-
ing unconstitutional a Minnesota statute prohibiting recovery-over
against an employer in the absence of a written indemnity agree-
ment,' 3' displayed as its most horrible example of potential inequity a
set of facts somewhat similar to those in Lunderberg. As a striking ex-
ample of the kind of common law remedy destroyed without a reason-
able substitute, the court narrated the following fact situation: (1) the
employer sold a car to the third party in faulty condition; (2) after one
of several service jobs done on the faulty car, an employee took the
third party for a drive to show that the car was repaired; (3) during the
trip the hood flew open, causing the employee to have a heart attack;
(4) the employee sued the third party because of the negligently home-
made hood latch; (5) the third party asserted in this third-party com-
plaint that the sole cause was the negligent conduct of the employer in
selling and servicing the car.132
New Jersey reached a conclusion similar to that in the bailment
cases when the special relation was that of principal to agent, entailing
the implied obligation of the principal to indemnify the agent for losses
or liabilities attending the carrying out of the agency. 33 The deceased
employee's widow had brought a wrongful-death action against one of
her husband's co-workers alleging negligence. 134 The co-worker im-
pleaded the employer as a third-party defendant on the ground that the
employer would be liable to indemnify the co-worker for torts commit-
ted at the direction of the employer. The dismissal of the third-party
suit was reversed. 135 Although there could be no contribution between
129. American Dist. Tel. Co. v. Kittleson, 179 F.2d 946 (8th Cir. 1950); Burris v. American
Chicle Co., 120 F.2d 218 (2d Cir. 1941); Westchester Lighting Co. v. Westchester County Small
Estates Corp., 278 N.Y. 175, 15 N.E.2d 567 (1938).
130. 241 Minn. at 363, 63 N.W.2d at 364.
131. Carlson v. Smogard, 298 Minn. 362, 369, 215 N.W.2d 615, 619-20 (1974).
132. Id. at 364-65, 215 N.W.2d at 617-18.
133. Hagen v. Koerner, 64 N.J. Super. 580, 166 A.2d 784 (1960).
134. In New Jersey, a co-employee at that time was not immune and could be sued as a third
party. Id. at 588, 166 A.2d at 788.
135. Id. at 588-89, 166 A.2d at 788.
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joint tortfeasors, indemnification would be allowed on the ground of an
implied promise of indemnity by the principal for damages resulting to
the agent from the execution of the agency. The court is careful to
point out that, if this were a simple case of negligence on the part of the
agent, indemnity would not apply. 36 But if the agent in good faith per-
forms a tortious act at his principal's direction, or if he commits a tor-
tious act relying on his principal's representations as to its legal
propriety, he is entitled to indemnity from the principal. 37 Although
in this case the pleadings were based on alleged negligence, the court
felt that, for purposes of a motion to dismiss, the state of the factual
record was not such as to exclude the possibility of a right of indemnity
based on the separate duty of the principal to indemnify his agent for
losses incurred in the execution of the agency.' 38
VI. IMPLIED CONTRACTUAL INDEMNITY
When the employer's relation to the third party is that of a con-
tractor doing work for the third party, there may be an implied obliga-
tion to perform the work with due care. If, by failing to use such care,
the employer causes an accident injuring his own employee, it may be
said that the employer has simultaneously breached two duties of care.
The one is toward the employee, and it is for this breach that compen-
sation bars any common-law remedy. The other is toward the third-
party contractee, and among the damages flowing from the breach of
this separate duty may be any damages the third party is forced to pay
the employee because of their relation.
A. Implied Contractual Indemnity under the Longshoremen's Act.
1. Summary of the Longshoremen's Act Story. Between 1955
and 1972, this doctrine was associated with and strongly influenced by
the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Ryan Stevedoring
Co. v. Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corp. 139 This case held, as indicated ear-
lier,14° that in a contract to perform stevedoring operations, the steve-
doring company impliedly agrees with the shipowner that it will both
perform these services in a workmanlike way and will indemnify the
136. Id. at 588, 166 A.2d at 788.
137. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 439 (1958).
138. 64 N.J. Super. at 587, 166 A.2d at 788.
139. 350 U.S. 124 (1956), aft'g 349 U.S. 901 (1955). This case was affirmed at 349 U.S. 901 by
an equally divided Court. After reargument before a full Court it was affirmed at 350 U.S. 124 by
a 5-to-4 vote, with Mr. Justice Black writing the dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice War-
ren, Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Clark joined.
140. See text accompanying notes 8-12 supra.
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shipowner for any liabilities he might incur as a result of the stevedor-
ing company's failure to fulfill this promise.141
This "Ryan"-type of liability, together with dozens of cases stem-
ming from the Ryan precedent, was abolished by Congress late in
1972.142 The abolition was in two steps, one affecting the employee's
cause of action against the ship in the first place, the other affecting the
Ryan liability-over of the longshoring employer. As to the first, it
should be pointed out that the groundwork for this line of cases had
been laid when the Supreme Court held in Seas Shioping Co. v. Sier-
acki143 that the virtual nonfault liability of the ship for "unseaworthi-
ness" extended to longshoremen. 144 The Ryan triangle typically began
with an unseaworthiness recovery by the employee against the ship.
The 1972 Amendments strike directly at this beginning-point by pro-
viding: "The liability of the vessel under this subsection shall not be
based upon the warranty of seaworthiness or a breach thereof at the
time the injury occurred. The remedy provided in this subsection shall
be exclusive of all other remedies against the vessel except remedies
available under this Act."' 45
There remains, of course, the possibility of a suit by the employee
against the ship based on negligence rather than unseaworthiness. The
1972 Amendments recognize this possibility, while placing a special
limitation on such liability, but then proceed immediately to knock out
any derivative Ryan-type recovery-over by the ship against the long-
shoring employer:
In the event of injury to a person covered under this Act caused by
the negligence of a vessel, then such person, or anyone otherwise en-
titled to recover damages by reason thereof, may bring an action
against such vessel as a third party in accordance with the provisions
of section 33 of this Act, and the employer shall not be liable to the
vessel for such damages directly or indirectly and any agreements or
warranties to the contrary shall be void. If such person was em-
ployed by the vessel to provide stevedoring services, no such action
shall be permitted if the injury was caused by the negligence of per-
sons engaged in providing stevedoring services to the vessel. If such
person was employed by the vessel to provide ship building or repair
services, no such action shall be permitted if the injury was caused by
the negligence of persons engaged in providing ship building or re-
pair services to the vessel."46
141. 350 U.S. at 132-35.
142. See 1972 Amendments, supra note 13.
143. 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
144. Id.
145. 1972 Amendments, supra note 13.
146. Id.
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It should be stressed that, despite the conspicuous place occupied
by the Ryan line of cases in this field, the recovery-over problem after
the demise of Ryan remains an important and active one both in fed-
eral cases other than those directly covered by the amendment, and in
state cases. Since the sheer volume of reported cases related to Ryan
was so great, they inevitably explored a rich assortment of detailed var-
iations and permutations of the recovery-over problem, any of which
may still arise under non-longshoreman federal law and under state
law. It remains important, therefore, to analyze this body of precedent
with some thoroughness. The discussion here is in three parts. The
first deals with pre-1972 federal law, where some of these precedents
may still have controlling force in non-longshoreman situations. The
second deals with developments since the 1972 Amendments, a domi-
nant theme of which is the effort of plaintiffs to find some way around
the restrictions imposed by the amendments. The third concerns state
law on contract-based implied indemnity, where Ryan will continue to
have some influence, both because of the prestige of the Supreme
Court, and because of the mass and variety of the body of case law it
fathered.
2. Pre-1972 Federal Law.
(a) The Ryan Doctrine. The first major point established by
Ryan was the decisive difference between recovery-over between par-
ties whose relation rests ultimately on contract, and recovery-over be-
tween parties whose basic relation is noncontractual in origin. 147 This
distinction was felt to be indispensable both to avoid the exclusive-rem-
edy provision of the Longshoremen's Act, and, in the process, to dist-
inguish Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Shi Ceiling & Roltting Corp. ,148 which
had ruled out contribution in noncollision cases.149 The distinction was
repeatedly reaffirmed by the Supreme Court150 and followed by the
federal courts,' 5 ' and, although it did not escape criticism, 52 it ap-
147. 350 U.S. at 130-32.
148. 342 U.S. 282 (1952).
149. See text accompanying notes 22-26 supra.
150. Federal Marine Terminals, Inc. v. Burnside Shipping Co., 394 U.S. 404 (1969); Italia
Societa per Azioni di Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., 376 U.S. 315 (1964); Waterman S.S.
Corp. v. Dugan & McNamara, Inc., 364 U.S. 421 (1960); Crumady v. The Joachim Hendrik
Fisser, 358 U.S. 423 (1959); Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. Nacirema Operating Co., 355 U.S. 563
(1958).
151. Feliciano v. Compania Transatlantica Espanola S.A., 411 F.2d 976 (Ist Cir. 1969); Mur-
ray v. United States, 405 F.2d 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co. v. Berry
Bros. Oil Serv., 377 F.2d 511 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 849 (1967); Wien Alaska Airlines v.
United States, 375 F.2d 736 (9th Cir.), ceri. denied, 389 U.S. 940 (1967); United Air Lines v.
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peared to be about as firmly entrenched as any rule of law could be.
It must be stressed again that the contract-tort distinction in this
connection goes to the roots of the parties' relation to each other, and
not to the theory of the remedy sought. We have already dealt with the
category in which the origin of the relation is noncontractual (e.g. a
collision) and the form of the remedy is noncontractual (contribution
between joint tortfeasors). We will later examine the category in which
the origin of the relation is noncontractual but the remedy is described
in contractual terms (e.g. indemnity). Ryan clearly could not be ex-
tended to this category. So far as the Ryan line of decisions is con-
cemed, there is no such creature as "noncontractual indemnity." The
Ryan category is contractual at both levels: there is some kind of con-
tract in the background from which the rights and duties of the parties
are ultimately derived, and the remedy is cast in contract-type terms,
typically indemnity. The reason this is crucial in these cases is that the
underlying contract is the rock on which is built the argument that the
recovery in a case like Ryan is not on account of the injury, but rather
on account of the contract.
(b) The 'ervice aspect" of the Ryan Doctrine. The discussion
up to this point has centered mainly on the rather negative point that a
Ryan-type liability was not possible in the absence of a contractual
base. But, of course, the fact that the relation between the third party
and the employer was contractual did not in itself mean that every ac-
tivity carried on in relation to the contract necessarily carried with it an
implied obligation that would support an indemnity action. This point
is well illustrated by the contrast between General Electric Co. v.
Moretz 153 and Halstead v. Norfolk & Western Ry.15 4 In Moretz, the
employee Moretz was a truck driver for Mason & Dixon Lines. His
truck overturned while transporting certain heavy equipment belong-
ing to General Electric Company. He sued General Electric on the
ground that the accident was due to its negligence in loading and insuf-
ficiently bracing the cargo.1 55 General Electric filed a third-party com-
plaint against Mason & Dixon contending that the accident was the
Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 951 (1964); General Elec. Co. v. Moretz,
270 F.2d 780 (4th Cir. 1959).
152. See Proudfoot, "The Tar Baby"' Marlime Personal-InjuryActlions, 20 STAN. L. REV. 423
(1968). Proudfoot believes most of the complications and inequities following Ryan could have
been avoided by handling the whole category of liability under tort principles.
153. 270 F.2d 780 (4th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 964 (1960).
154. 236 F. Supp. 182 (S.D. W. Va. 1964) (applying West Virginia law), aj'd, 350 F.2d 917
(4th Cir. 1965).
155. 270 F.2d at 782.
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fault of the carrier and demanding indemnity.156 The carrier was sub-
ject to the regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC),
one of which stated that "no motor vehicle shall be driven unless the
driver thereof shall have satisfied himself that... all means of fasten-
ing the load are securely in place."'157 Moretz reported to his employer
that the load was not properly fastened, but the employer did nothing
about it. The court read into the contract between the carrier and Gen-
eral Electric the ICC regulation, and held that under it the carrier as-
sumed a direct and specific obligation to General Electric to secure the
cargo properly. 58 This obligation was found breached, and an obliga-
tion to indemnify General Electric arose.
In Halstead the relation between employer and third party was in
a sense the reverse of that in Moretz. The employer in Halstead was
engaged in unloading its own property from the railway when its em-
ployee was injured. The railway, having been sued by the employee,
filed a third-party complaint against the employer, relying heavily on
Moretz. 59 It cited an ICC regulation placing the responsibility for
unloading on the shipper.' 60 From this the railway tried to extract an
implied duty to the railroad to perform the work in such a way as not to
impose liability on the railway. The court distinguished Moretz in sev-
eral ways,' 61 but principally on the ground that in Moretz the trucker
was performing a service for the third party, along with which the duty
of care ran.162 Here the employer was performing no service for the
third party, but only for himself. "This 'service aspect,'" said the
court, "is what the Ryan doctrine is founded on, and it was so empha-
sized in Crumady v. The Joachim Hendrick Fisser, 358 U.S. 423, 79 S.
Ct. 445, 3 L.Ed.2d 413."163
The court relied on the decision in Hill Lines, Inc. v. Pittsburgh
Plate Glass Co. ,64 in which the facts were substantially identical except
that a truck line instead of a railway played the role of third party. The
trucker asserted that the shipper-employer had a duty to unload the
truck in a careful and prudent manner, and that this was an independ-
156. Id. at 782-83.
157. 49 C.F.RL 193.9(b) (1959).
158. 270 F.2d at 787-89.
159. 236 F.Supp. at 184.
160. Id (quoting UNIF. FREIGHT CLASSIFICATION 5, Rule 27, § 1).
161. E.g., in Moretz there was not only an express jury finding that the employer's negligence
was the proximate cause of the accident but also an express contractual obligation of the employer
to secure the cargo. Neither of these facts had a counterpart in Halstead.
162. 236 F.Supp. at 186.
163. Id. at 187.
164. 222 F.2d 854 (10th Cir. 1955) (decided under the New Mexico Workmen's Compensation
Act).
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ent duty running to the trucker. The Tenth Circuit flatly rejected this
theory.
The Halstead-Hill interpretation of Ryan means that, even if there
is a contract between employer and third party, and even if this con-
tract contains an implied obligation to perform certain functions with
care because of incorporation by reference of ICC regulations or other-
wise, this still does not generate a Ryan-type independent duty unless
the functions being performed were a service to the third person under
the contract. The analogy to a duty running with a manufacturer's sale
of goods, invoked in the Ryan opinion itself,165 and again in Crumady,
is clear, with services being substituted for goods. If no services are
passing from the employer to the third person under the contract, the
analogy breaks down.
(c) Scope of the Ryan Doctrine. The question whether the Ryan
rule of implied indemnity was a limited maritime rule, or whether it
was a principle of general applicability, remains an important one.
Cases continue to arise on this issue under the 1972 Amendments, 166
since if a principle of general applicability was established, a nonvessel
may still be able to assert this kind of implied indemnity obligation
against a stevedore. It might therefore, be useful to note here the cases
on this point that arose before 1972.
Perhaps the narrowest compass suggested for the doctrine was the
precise fact situation under which Ryan arose, that is, the triangular
relation under admiralty law of the stevedore, the longshoreman, and
the shipowner. This was the position adopted by the Fifth Circuit. As
Chief Judge John R. Brown colorfully expressed it in United States v.
Seckinger:167
But the Government, as do all parties today, when everything
else fails, falls back on the Tinker-to-Evers-to-Chance multiple im-
pleaders in the Sieracki-Ryan-Yaka situations of indemnity based
upon breach of the WWLP-the breach of the warranty of work-
manlike performance. So far this court has kept this newly formed
concept strictly confined to salt water or at least amphibious
applications.
Seckinger involved an accident on dry land at a marine depot.
The employee of a contractor had obtained a judgment against the
165. 350 U.S. at 133-34.
166. See, e.g., Zapico v. Bucyrus-Erie Co. v. Atlantic Container Line, Ltd., 579 F.2d 714 (2d
Cir. 1978); Hamilton v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 495 F.Supp. 718 (E.D.La. 1980); Travis v. Interna-
tional MultiFoods Corp., 464 F.Supp. 503 (W.D.N.Y. 1978).
167. United States v. Seckinger, 408 F.2d 146, 153 (5th Cir. 1969), rey'd, 397 U.S. 203 (1970)
(reversed on indemnity issue).
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United States for injuries incurred when he came in contact with a high
voltage wire which, due to the government's negligence, had not been
de-energized. The government then sued the contractor under an ex-
press contract of indemnification. The main point of the case was the
familiar one that an express contract of indemnification will not be
construed to cover the indemnitee's own negligence unless this is spe-
cifically stated in contract.168 But, as Judge Brown indicated, as a last
resort the government had fallen back on the implied indemnity theory
of Ryan. The court not only refused to extend Ryan to nonmaritime
cases, but added that "the express indemnity agreement may have
waived any possible implied one."' 69 The Fifth Circuit's rule limiting
Ryan essentially to its own fact situation dates from Halliburton Co. v.
Norton Drilling Co. ,170 which refused to apply Ryan even in a case con-
trolled by federal maritime law, but not presenting the stevedore-long-
shoreman-shipowner pattern. The locus of the injury was on a drilling
barge in navigable waters, but the cast of characters consisted of an oil
company, a drilling company, and an oil well servicing concern. The
court concluded that, to the extent the Ryan line of cases permitted
indemnification even when the indemnitee was to some degree negli-
gent, this rule should be limited to stevedore-shipowner situations.' 7'
It accounted for the exceptional rule in stevedoring cases by the fact
that when a ship enters port the stevedore must know that it may have
been battered by its sea trip and therefore full of hazards.' 72 In Cen-
traal Stiks/of Verkoopkanter, N. v. Walsh Stevedoring Co. ,173 the Fifth
Circuit reaffirmed its position, saying that "[t]he implied warranty es-
tablished in Ryan is a product of the admiralty courts and a creature of
admiralty law. . . . Those cases in which the doctrine has been applied
have been admiralty cases which presented substantially similar cir-
cumstances to those existing in Ryan.1 74 In the same year, the same
court refused to apply the Ryan line of cases in a maritime situation
involving repair work on a fixed, unmanned platform in the Gulf of
168. The case was reversed by the Supreme Court on the indemnity issue. 397 U.S. 203, 219-
27 (1970).
169. 408 F.2d at 153 n.18 (quoting Koninklyke v. Strachan Shipping Co., 301 F.2d 741, 746
(5th Cir. 1962)).
170. 302 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 829 (1963). See also Delta Eng'r Corp.
v. Scott, 322 F.2d 11 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 905 (1964).
171. 302 F.2d at 435.
172. See id at 436-37. The court cites a long, vivid passage on the perils of the sea and the
consequent possible ragged condition of a newly-arrived ship from the opinion of Judge Mathes in
Huger v. Dampskisaktieselskabet Int'l, 170 F.Supp. 601, 609-10 (S.D. Cal. 1959), af'dsub nont
Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. Dampskisaktieselskabet Int'l, 274 F.2d 875 (9th Cir. 1960).
173. 380 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1967).
174. Id. at 529.
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Mexico.' 75 If the Fifth Circuit is, in these cases, trying to say that the
central principle of the Ryan case itself cannot be extrapolated beyond
stevedoring situations, the attempted limitation is debatable. But if
what is meant is that some of the applications of Ryan to particular
combinations of relative fault between stevedore and shipowner have
no counterpart in cases not involving shipowners, the position is more
defensible.
The central principle of Ryan, that there may be an implied obli-
gation to use care in a service contract accompanied by an implied
agreement of indemnity for breach of that obligation, has by no means
been confined to maritime or shipowner cases, and has been applied in
both state176 and federal1 77 courts in a variety of situations.
It is also a mistake to confine Ryan, as was essayed in Florida
Power Light Co. v. Hercules Concrete Pile Co. ,178 to cases in which the
indemnitee has been held liable without fault. The court there con-
cluded, "It therefore appears that if the Ryan doctrine is extended, it
would be extended only in favor of an indemnitee who has been liable
without fault, based on some concept of strict liability such as unsea-
worthiness."' 179 The quickest way to expose the fallacy of limiting
Ryan to cases in which the indenmitee has been held liable without
175. Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co. v. Berry Bros. Oilfield Serv., 377 F.2d 511 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 849 (1967). The court quotes the Supreme Court's language in Italia, 376
U.S. 315 (1964), to support isolation of Ryan:
But we deal here with a suit for indemnification based upon a maritime contract, gov-
erned by federal law .... in an area where rather special rules governing the obligations
and liability of shipo wnersprevail, rules that are designed to minimize the hazards encoun-
tered by seamen, to compensate seamenfor the accidents that inevitably occur, and to mini-
mize the likelihood of such accidents.
377 F.2d at 513 (quoting Italia, 376 U.S. at 324). Note, however, that these "rather special" rules
are concerned not with stevedoring companies but with seamen, and, of course, with longshore-
men under the Sieracki rule holding that the liability of a shipowner for unseaworthiness extends
to longshoremen. The only special feature, then, of Ryan-type fact situations is that the shipowner
may become liable to the longshoreman without fault under the seaworthiness doctrine. Fact
situations may therefore arise in which, as in Italia, the employer can become liable with very
little fault because the shipowner has become liable with no fault. But fact situations may also
arise-and these are much more common-in which the shipowner was guilty of some degree of
negligence and would have been liable to the plaintiff longshoremen even if the special seaworthi-
ness liability did not exist. The Ryan rule clearly applies to such cases, and, this being so, there is
no reason why the Ryan cases should not be carried over to nonshipowner situations when the
actual relation between the fault of the employer and third party is the same in principle.
176. See Blockford v. Sioux City Dressed Pork, Inc., 254 Iowa 845, 118 N.W.2d 559 (1962);
Whittenberg Eng'g & Constr. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 390 S.W.2d 877 (Ky. Ct. App. 1965);
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Kaiser Gypsum Co., 273 Or. 162, 539 P.2d 1065 (1975); Pan
American Petroleum Corp. v. Maddux Well Serv., 586 P.2d 1220 (Wyo. 1978).
177. See, eg, General Elec. Co. v. Moretz, 270 F.2d 780 (4th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S.
964 (1960); see text accompanying notes 153-58 supra for a discussion of the case.
178. 275 F. Supp. 427, 430 (S.D. Fla. 1967).
179. Id.
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fault is to adduce Weyerhaeuser Steamshi Co. v. Nacirema Operating
Co. ,18 in which the shipowner was indeed found by the jury to have
been negligent, and in which his liability to the longshoreman had in
fact been based on negligence and not on unseaworthiness-and in
which the shipowner nevertheless recovered indemnity under Ryan.18'
Indeed, the jury actually found that the ship was not unseaworthy as
the result of the shipowner's negligence.1 82 The case is thus clear au-
thority for the proposition that there may be indemnity on the part of
the employer stevedore for an injury resulting from the concurring neg-
ligence of employer and shipowner.
In summary, it appears the sounder view to reject both of the pre-
1972 efforts to limit Ryan, one on the basis of a factual limitation to salt
water, shipowners and stevedores, and the other on the basis of a con-
ceptual limitation to strict liability in the indemnitee.
3. Developments Since the 1972 Longshoremen's Act Amendments.
(a) Attempts to evade the recovery-over restriction. The abolition
of recovery-over by the ship against the stevedore was not accepted
without a struggle by the members of the admiralty and personal injury
bars. The chink through which the reintroduction of such recovery-
over was attempted was the failure of Congress to address in explicit
language the case of concurrent negligence by the ship and the steve-
dore. The argument runs like this: the amendment deals only with
injury "caused by the negligence of a vessel," and says that the em-
ployer shall not be liable to the vessel "for such damages directly or
indirectly"; 183 however, the argument continues, the recovery-over
claim is not for "such damages," i e., damages caused by the ship's neg-
ligence, but for damages caused by the stevedore's concurring
negligence. 184
Ingenious as this argument is, it encounters two formidable road-
blocks. The first is the legislative history of the amendment, which sup-
180. 355 U.S. 563 (1958).
181. Id. at 567.
182. Id. at 564.
183. See 1972 Amendments, supra note 13. See text accompanying note 146 supra.
184. This argument does not hold up well under scrutiny. As a matter of elementary tort law,
the negligent ship is liable to the plaintiff longshoreman for all the damages he has suffered, even
if another tortfeasor might have contributed to the result by his concurrent negligence. If this
were not so, how would it happen that the shipowner finds himself in fact liable to the plaintiff for
the total damages? In the legal sense, then, the injury caused by the vessel's negligence with its
resulting damages are indivisible at the moment the statute takes hold. "Such damages" can only
mean the damages for which the ship has at that point been held liable-that is, the total damages.
And for "such damages" the employer is expressly made not liable.
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ports the conclusion that Congress intended to eliminate recovery-over
against the stevedore altogether.18 5 The second is that, even if the argu-
ment is correct, the net result is merely that the situation has been re-
stored to what it was before Ryan-that is, that such recovery-over is
barred by the basic rule that contribution between joint tortfeasors is
ruled out by the exclusive remedy clause. 8 6
The first post-amendment case to deal with this issue, Lucas v.
"Brinknes" Schffahrts Ges. Franz Lange G.N.B.H & Co. G. ,17 con-
cluded that all recovery-over actions by the ship against the stevedore
were barred after the amendment. s18 The injured longshoreman had
collected workmen's compensation from the stevedore, and then sued
the owner of the vessel, alleging negligence, since the unseaworthiness
action had been abolished. 8 9 The shipowner, in turn, fired a shotgun
blast of possible claims against the stevedore, including every known
variety of complete or partial reimbursement: 90 indemnity, full or par-
tial, for the damages awarded-a somewhat futile gesture in view of the
amendment; a fifty percent credit or reduction of any damages-evi-
dently an attempt to invoke the District of Columbia Murray Rule;191
contribution for a proportionate share of any damages, inspired no
doubt by the New York case of Dole;192 and contribution or indemnity
in the amount of workmen's compensation benefits paid or payable,
reminiscent of the "Pennsylvania rule."' 193
A three-judge panel, specially convened to handle the large vol-
ume of similar cases pending in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,
granted the stevedore's motion to dismiss all of these complaints for
failure to state a cause of action. 94 The main rationale of the court's
decision was largely the first of the two roadblocks mentioned earlier,
the congressional intent to abolish all recoveries-over by the shipowner
against the stevedore. The court undertook an extensive examination
of the legislative history behind the 1972 Amendments, and reached the
conclusion that this history revealed an "[o]verriding concern to insu-
late the employer. . ." from any liability other than compensation lia-
185. See S. REP. No. 1125, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1972); H. R. REP. No. 1441, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess. 4-8 (1972).
186. See cases cited at note 17 supra.
187. 1974 A.M.C. 1085 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
188. Id. at 1099.
189. Id. at 1095.
190. Id. at 1086-87.
191. See text accompanying notes 49-52 supra.
192. 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972).
193. See text accompanying notes 27-31 supra.
194. 1974 A.M.C. at 1087.
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bility.195 The court noted the balancing of interests of all parties that
went into the amendment, with the shipowner receiving immunity from
indemnity actions. The court said, referring to the amendment:
It specifically provided that the employer could not be held liable to
the vessel by means of indemnity or hold harmless agreements.
These prohibitions could only relate to attempts by the vessel to shift
its negligence liability to the employer, for it is only for negligence
that the vessel can be held liable. 196
At another point, the court observes:
Congress sought to eliminate all actions against the stevedore
whether for indemnity or contribution, whether based on tort or on
contract, and whether for fees and expenses. Allowance of all such
actions, even a pro tanto recovery to the extent of payments made by
the employer under the Act, would create the circuitous type action
Congress considered was too costly and disruptive of the compensa-
tion scheme to be permitted.197
The principal line of argument against this conclusion relies on the
almost complete absence, 198 both in the language of the amendment
and in the legislative history, of any express treatment of the problem
of con'current negligence, as distinguished from the problem of unsea-
worthiness liability followed by an indemnity action. Too much signifi-
cance, however, should not be attached to this omission. The problem
before Congress, after all, was not one of concurrent negligence; it was
the flood of cases released by Sieracki and Ryan. It was obviously as-
195. Id. at 1098.
196. Id. at 1099.
197. Id. at 1100.
198. There was one significant colloquy suggesting that the subject was not completely over-
looked. David B. Kaplan, Chairman of the Admiralty Section of the American Trial Lawyers
Association, submitted a prepared statement discussing the possibility of proration of damages
between the shipowner and the stevedore on the basis of their relative fault. Proposed.4mendments
to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act: Hearings on S, 2318, S. 1547
Before the Subcomm on Labor ofthe Senate Comm. on Labor andPublic Welfare, 92nd Cong., 2d
Sess. 355 (1972). In response to Mr. Kaplan's oral testimony supporting such a comparative negli-
gence approach, Senator Eagleton stated:
Are you not really debating with us the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the concept of work-
men's compensation and then I will add to that, was not that debate had in this country
in the twenties, late twenties and thirties, when compensation was first coming into
vogue in various States; that is, it was hotly debated, as I read about it?
Many trial lawyers back in that era bitterly opposed it. They strongly lobbied at the
State level, to seeing that workmen's compensation not be enacted in [sic] various States.
Whether rightly or wrongly, have we not crossed that bridge? And we now have
workmen's compensation; and once you have workmen's compensation, you have it?
Id. at 355. Making allowances for the convoluted and syntactically imperfect character of this
excerpt, one can discern a tacit congressional assumption that the inappropriateness of any such
comparative negligence liability on the part of the employer was well settled as part of the intrinsic
tradition of workmen's compensation.
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sumed by Congress that, under existing cases on contribution, 99 no
recovery-over against a concurrently negligent stevedore was possible,
and that therefore no special mention of that kind of liability was nec-
essary to confirm that it was barred. The Ryan opinion itself had been
at some pains to stress the distinction between contribution and indem-
nity,200 to clear the way for the allowance of an indemnity recovery in
spite of the assumed unavailability of contribution.
In any event, the language of the statute is by no means literally
confined to indemnity. Although it does not expressly speak of contri-
bution in concurring negligence cases, the general language is broad
enough to cover any such claim. It states in unqualified terms: "the
employer shall not be liable to the vessel for such damages directly or
indirectly." 20' This language plainly covers liability in the form of con-
tribution or any other kind of sharing of the damages, whether by in-
demnity or otherwise. The passage then goes on to state: "and any
agreement and warranties of the contrary shall be void. ' 20 2 This in-
troduces the Ryan-type of liability, but only as an addendum to the
unlimited bar just preceding this clause. It is grammatically and logi-
cally impossible to read the entire passage as being somehow confined
to the area referred to in the addendum, that of warranties giving rise
to indemnity claims.
Since the failure of the recovery-over attempt in Lucas, and in one
or two other district court cases,203 the attempt to break down the
amendment's almost impregnable barrier against such recoveries ap-
pears to have been largely abandoned. But one of the other devices
tried in Lucas, the earlier Pennsylvania-type compromise, generated
several more years of controversy, until put to rest by the Supreme
Court in 1979 in Edwards v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique.2 4 In
Edmonds, a longshoreman, employed by a stevedoring company, was
injured while working aboard a ship. The longshoreman brought a tort
suit alleging negligence by the shipowner. A jury found that the steve-
doring company's negligence contributed 70% of the fault, the ship's
20%, and the longshoreman's 10%.205 On rehearing, sitting en banc, the
199. See, ag., Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953); Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship
Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282 (1952); Murray v. United States, 405 F.2d 1361 (D.C. Cir.
1968).
200. See text accompanying notes 150-53 supra.
201. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b)(1976). See text accompanying note 147 supra.
202. Id.
203. See Swans v. United States Lines, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 388, 393-94 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Landon
v. Lief Hoegh & Co., 386 F. Supp. 1081, 1084 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
204. 443 U.S. 256 (1979).
205. Id. at 258.
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Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit adopted a comparative negli-
gence standard and held that the shipowner could be required to pay
only that proportion of the total damages which matched its proportion
of fault.20 6 The court noted that its decision conflicted with decisions in
the Fifth207 and Ninth2 8 Circuits. The Supreme Court reversed, hold-
ing that the 1972 Amendments were not intended to change the judge-
made rule that the shipowner was liable for all damages not due to the
employee's fault, including damages due to the employer's negli-
gence. 20 9 The Court was sensitive to the equitable arguments for un-
dertaking some kind of apportionment. But the plain language of the
amendment left no room for such considerations: "the employer shall
not be liable to the vessel for such damages directly or indirectly. ' 210
The apportionment undertaken below clearly had the effect of making
the employer liable indirectly. This being the rationale of the decision
it is obviously no less applicable in cases in which the employer has
intervened and prosecuted the case.21'
(b) Attempts to broaden the groundsfor liability of the sho. The
1972 amendments were intended to break the Ryan cycle at two points.
The one break was at the point of the recovery-over by the vessel
against the employer; as we have just seen, efforts to thwart this break
have failed completely. The other break was at the point of the em-
ployee's recovery from the vessel for unseaworthiness, leaving intact,
however, his action for "negligence." Here the plaintiffs' efforts have
taken the form of trying to maximize the grounds for the vessel's liabil-
ity, if possible, stretching them to include some kind of strict liability
other than unseaworthiness. An enormous volume of litigation and re-
ported case law has developed, but here again the Supreme Court went
a long way toward clearing the decks, with its 1981 opinion in Scindia
Steam Navigation Co. v. Santos.212 Santos was a longshoreman un-
loading cargo when sacks of wheat fell on him from a pallet overhead.
The winch used in unloading the wheat had a brake mechanism which
had malfunctioned on the day of the accident as well as on the previous
two days.213 The Court considered the negligence standards under sec-
206. 577 F.2d 1153, 1155 (4th Cir. 1978).
207. See Samuels v. Empresa Lineas Maritimas Argentinas, 573 F.2d 884, 888-39 (5th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 915 (1979).
208. See Shellman v. United States Lines, Inc., 528 F.2d 675, 680-81 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 936 (1976).
209. 443 U.S. at 266.
210. Id. at 265-66.
211. See McCormack v. Noble Drilling Corp., 608 F.2d 169, 175 (5th Cir. 1979).
212. 451 U.S. 156 (1981).
213. Id. at 160.
HeinOnline  -- 7 Workmen's Comp. L. Rev. 422 1983-1984
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW REVIEW
tion 5(b)214 suits against the shipowner. The district court had applied
the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS land-based rules for invitees:
the shipowner was not liable for dangerous conditions caused by the
stevedore's negligence while the stevedore was in exclusive control of
the work, since the shipowner could not have known of the dangerous
condition.215 Nor was he under a duty to warn the stevedore of open or
obvious dangers and defects. 216 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit reversed a summary judgment for Scindia.217 It rejected the
land-based Restatement standards as incorporating such notions as
contributory negligence and assumption of risk.218 It held the ship-
owner liable if the owner was aware of an unreasonable risk to the
longshoremen and failed to use reasonable care to protect them.219 It
also held that Scindia had a duty to inspect even after turning over the
ship in safe condition to the stevedore.220 The Supreme Court dis-
agreed with both courts.221 The Court first reiterated its holding in
Marine Terminals v. Burnside Shipping Co. :222 the shipowner had a
duty to exercise reasonable care and warn the stevedore of defects
known to him that would not be obvious to the stevedore.223 But the
shipowner need not have supervised the stevedoring operation.
Absent contract provision, positive law or custom to the contrary...
the shipowner has no general duty by way of supervision or inspec-
tion to exercise reasonable care to discover dangerous conditions that
develop within the confines of the cargo operations that are assigned
to the stevedore .... [T]he shipowner is not liable to the longshore-
men for injuries caused by dangers unknown to the owner and about
which he had no duty to inform himself.2 2 4
However, the shipowner may have a duty to intervene when a danger-
ous condition exists in the cargo operation, such as the malfunctioning
winch, which is known by the stevedore and dangerous to longshore-
men.225 The Court thought it possible that the stevedore's "judgment
in this respect was so obviously improvident that Scindia, if it knew of
the defect and that [the stevedore] was continuing to use it, should have
214. 33 U.S.C. 905(b) (1976).
215. Santos v. Scindia Steam Navigation Co., 1976 A.M.C. 2583, 2586 (W.D. Wash. 1976),
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343-343A (1965)).
216. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 343-343A (1965).
217. 598 F.2d 480, 491 (9th Cir. 1979).
218. Id. at 486.
219. Id. at 489.
220. Id.
221. 451 U.S. at 168, 174-75.
222. 394 U.S. 404 (1969).
223. Id. at 418.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 415-17 nn.17 & 18.
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realized the winch presented an unreasonable risk of harm to the long-
shoremen, and that in such circumstance it had a duty to intervene and
repair the ship's winch. The same would be true if the defect existed
from the outset and Scindia must be deemed to have been aware of the
condition. '226 The Court then said an inquiry into safety statutes, regu-
lations, and customs was necessary to determine whether the ship had a
duty to repair the winch.227 The case was remanded to discover
whether the shipowner had actual knowledge or was chargeable with
knowledge of the defective winch.228
While Scindia may not have dealt specifically with the many de-
tails presented by these cases, the great bulk of the questions can be
answered by considering them against the broad principles the Court
announced as well as against those the Court rejected.22 9
(c) Effect of 1972 Amendments on nonvessel third parties. The
abolition by the 1972 Amendments of recovery-over against the em-
ployer was expressly limited to such actions brought by vessels. This
has given rise to three questions on the impact of this change on
nonvessels, two of which are rather one-sided, and the third of which is
more troublesome.
The first question is whether the amendments in any way altered
the well-established rule banning recovery-over in the form of contri-
bution. The courts have consistently held that there is nothing in the
amendments indicating that any such change was intended.2 30 The sec-
ond question is whether the provision that "any agreements and war-
ranties to the contrary shall be void" 231-which plainly includes
express warranties-invalidates express indemnity agreements between
the employer and a nonvessel third party. Again, the courts consist-
ently hold that, under the clear language of the statute, an agreement
with a nonvessel third party is not affected.
232
Somewhat closer is the third question: whether, after the amend-
ments, the nonvessel third party can assert against the employer a
Ryan-style implied warranty of workmanlike performance. Most
226. 451 U.S. 175-76 (footnote omitted).
227. Id.
228. Id. at 175-76.
229. For a detailed examination of pre-Scindia cases, some of which are clearly discredited,
others of which may have minor value as to details, see A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION,
§ 76.63(c) n.23 (1982).
230. See, e.g., Zapico v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 579 F.2d 714, 719 (2d Cir. 1978).
231. Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1976).
232. E.g., Olsen v. Shell Oil Co., 595 F.2d 1099, 1103 (5th Cir.), cert. denied., 444 U.S. 979
(1979).
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courts, 2 33 but not all, 234 have refused to recognize such an implied war-
ranty. It was noted earlier that, long before the 1972 Amendments, a
number of courts had struggled with the question whether the Ryan
principle was confined to the vessel-stevedore relation, or whether it
was of general applicability. The analysis at that point concluded that
the preponderance of authority supported the latter view.235 The argu-
ments in the post-1972 cases are largely a reprise of the earlier argu-
ments.236 In one respect the amendments have weakened the case for
indemnity, by undermining the third-party beneficiary argument. In
several of the unsuccessful post-1972 cases, the nonvessel third party
argued that he was the third-party beneficiary of an implied warranty
running from the stevedore to the ship.237 In each case, the argument
was rejected on the ground that the 1972 Amendments had destroyed
that underlying warranty itself.238 They did not merely block the ves-
sel's remedy; they declared the warranty void, so that no one, vessel or
nonvessel, could extract any remedy from it. The successful case of
Gould v. General Mills, Inc. 239 stands out from the others by reason of
the extent to which it relied on totally independent duties running, not
from the stevedore to the vessel, but from the stevedore to the nonves-
sel third party, such as the duty to provide qualified personnel.240 An-
other post-1972 argument against implied indemnity has also perhaps
more force after the total experience of the Ryan story than before.
This is the contention that there was a sort of reciprocity between the
Ryan implied warranty and the Sieracki unseaworthiness liability.
That is, the unseaworthiness liability cast such a heavy burden on the
ship-as became increasingly evident in the years leading up to 1972-
233. See, e.g., Zapico v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 579 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1978); Hamilton v. Mesa
Petroleum Co., 495 F. Supp. 718, 720-22 (E.D. La. 1980); Travis v. International Multifoods
Corp., 464 F. Supp. 503, 507-08 (W.D.N.Y. 1978); Kane v. Firestone Steel Prods. Co., 463 F.
Supp. 473 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Spadola v. Viking Yacht Co., 441 F. Supp. 798, 800-03 (S.D.N.Y.
1977); S.S. Seatrain La. v. California Stevedore & Ballast Co., 424 F. Supp. 180, 183-84 (N.D. Cal.
1976); Fitzgerald v. Compania Naviera La Molinera, 394 F. Supp. 402, 408 (E.D. La. 1974). See
also McCune v. F. Alioto Fish Co., 597 F.2d 1244, 1251 (9th Cir. 1979) (recognizing that the Ryan
implied warranty had been extended to non-stevedoring cases, the court declined to extend it to
the manufacture of products).
234. See, e.g., Gould v. General Mills, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 1181, 1184 (W.D.N.Y. 1976).
235. See text accompanying notes 166-82 supra.
236. See, eg., Hamilton v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 495 F. Supp. 718 (E.D. La. 1980), relying
directly on Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co. v. Berry Bros. Oilfield Sew., 377 F.2d 511 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 849 (1967) (a pre-1972 case).
237. See Zapico v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 579 F.2d 714, 719 (2d Cir. 1978); Travis v. International
Multifoods Corp., 464 F. Supp. 503, 507-08 (W.D.N.Y. 1978); S.S. Seatrain Louisiana v. Califor-
nia Stevedore & Ballast Co., 424 F. Supp. 180, 183-84 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
238. Id.
239. 411 F. Supp. 1181 (W.D.N.Y. 1976).
240. Seeid at 1184.
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that the implied warranty rule was devised to help the ship shift some
of that burden to the stevedore. It follows, so the argument runs, that
there was no comparable justification for providing the implied-war-
ranty type of relief to others than shipowners. 24' There is a second
argument against indemnity made possible by the amendments. It
could be urged that Congress, in these amendments, was giving expres-
sion to a broad public policy disfavoring the kind of litigation-fo-
menting spiral associated with Ryan,242 and that accordingly the sweep
of the amendments should not be too literally restricted to the four cor-
ners of the statutory language. The Second Circuit, in Zapico v. Bucy-
rus-Erie Co. ,243 declined to adopt this rationale, relying instead on the
simple absence of an independent duty of care running from the user of
a negligently manufactured product to the manufacturer.244 As we
shall see, this approach has had more success when the issue was that of
extending the impact of the amendments to the Federal Employees'
Compensation Act.
(d). Effect of 1972 Amendments on FECA liabilities. The first
circuit to deal with the question whether the impact of the 1972
Amendments should be extended to the Federal Employees' Compen-
sation Act (FECA) was the Fifth Circuit, in Aparicio v. Swan Lake.245
Harbor workers employed by the Panama Canal Company filed unsea-
worthiness and negligence claims against vessels on which they were
injured. The ships in turn alleged a Sieracki-Ryan breach of warranty
of workmanlike performance against the employer.2 46 The Panama
Canal Company asserted as a defense to the warranty claim immunity
based on the 1972 Amendments to the LHWCA. The court held that
such a defense was not available to the Company because its workers
were covered by the FECA and not by the LHWCA.247 There was no
intent, either in section 5(b) or in the legislative history, "to liberate
from Sieracki vessel owners and stevedores not subject to LHWCA lia-
bility. ' 248 Unaware of what the Fifth Circuit had decided five days
earlier inAparicio, the Ninth Circuit reached the opposite result in Nor-
241. See S.S. Seatrain Louisiana v. California Stevedore & Ballast Co., 424 F. Supp. 180
(N.D. Cal. 1976); Fitzgerald v. Compania Naviera La Molinera, 394 F. Supp. 402 (E.D. La. 1974),
in which this rationale figured strongly.
242. See, e.g., Travis v. International Multifoods, 464 F. Supp. 503, 506 (W.D.N.Y. 1978).
243. 579 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1978).
244. Id. at 723.
245. 643 F.2d 1109 (5th Cir. 1981).
246. Id. at 1110.
247. Id. at 1118.
248. Id. at 1116.
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mile v. Maritime Co. 249 It held that a federally-employed longshore-
man had no unseaworthiness remedy. The court rejected the
application of Sieracki to FECA-covered employees, although the 1972
Amendments overruling Sieracki applied only to that Act, and section
3(a)(2) of the LHWCA specifically exempted federal employees from
its coverage. °50 The court postulated that, although the LHWCA
amendments "eviscerated if not eliminated Sieracki,' '251 Congress ad-
dressed only the most obvious cases and left it to the courts "to inter-
weave the new legislative policies with the inherited body of common-
law principles. '252 The court did not explain why Congress would not
have amended the FECA if it had wanted the 1972 Amendments to
affect both acts. Nor did the court explain why it noted as remedies
available to Normile both compensation under the FECA and negli-
gence recovery under section 5(b) after it recognized the restrictions of
Section 3(a)(2). 253
B. Implied Contractual ndemnity under State Law.
When we turn to cases arising under state law, we find a sharp
divergence of opinion between the minority of jursidictions which hold
that, when the relation between the parties is based on contract, an
obligation of care with accompanying indemnity obligation can be im-
plied which survives the exclusiveness defense,254 and the majority that
reject the implied indemnity doctrine.255
249. 643 F.2d 1380 (9th Cir. 1981).
250. Id.
251. Id. at 1382.
252. Id. at 1382 n.3 (citations omitted).
253. Id. at 1382 n.2.
254. See, e.g. Ham v. Standard Eng'g Co., 416 F.Supp. 116"8 (D. S.D. 1976) (applying South
Dakota law); Blackford v. Sioux City Dressed Pork, Inc., 254 Iowa 845, 118 N.W.2d 559 (1962);
Whittenberg Eng'g & Constr. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 390 S.W.2d 877 (Ky. Ct. App. 1965);
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Kaiser Gypsum Co., 273 Or. 162, 539 P.2d 1065 (1975) (An
employee of Kaiser lost his hand when testing a machine which had had its protective guard
removed at Kaiser's request. The employee sued the insurer of the company that installed the
machine and settled for $25,000. Id. at 164, 539 P.2d at 1066. The insurer brought a third-party
action against Kaiser seeking indemnity. The court held that Kaiser owed an independent duty to
the installer to maintain the protective guard, and therefore could not defend the indemnity action
on the basis of employer immunity under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Id. at 166-67, 539
P.2d at 1067); Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. v. Maddux Well Serv., 586 P.2d 1220 (Wyo. 1978).
255. See, e.g., Missouri Pub. Serv. Co. v. Henningsen Steel Prods. Co., 612 F.2d 363 (8th Cir.
1980) (applying Missouri law); Bjerk v. Universal Eng'g Corp., 552 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1977)
(applying Minnesota law); Kudelka v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 541 F.2d 651 (7th Cir.
1976) (applying the FECA); General Elec. Co. v. Cuban Am. Nickel Co., 396 F.2d 89 (5th Cir.
1968) (applying Louisiana law); Centraal Stikstof Verkoopkanter, N.V. v. Walsh Stevedoring Co.,
380 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1967) (holding that the implied warranty in Ryan was a product of admi-
ralty law and should not be extended to a case controlled by Alabama law); Bertone v. Turco
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A great part of the controversy between these cases has been sup-
plied, not by the issue whether an independent duty to indemnify based
on contract is free of the compensation exclusiveness principle, but by
the issue whether under the law of the jurisdiction there is an implied
obligation of care and indemnity in the circumstances. Because Ryan
and related maritime cases bulked so large in this area, courts all too
often approached the issue as if it were a .matter of taking sides for or
against Ryan; some would then emphasize the peculiarities of the steve-
dore-shipowner situation, and conclude that apart from such peculiari-
ties Ryan should not be emulated.256 As we have seen, however, the
doctrine here involved has some support in nonstevedore, nonmari-
time, and nonfederal-law cases. The limiting factor is not the maritime
quality but rather the underlying contractual quality of the relation.
The key to this type of case is that some kind of service was performed
for the indemnitee under contract, along which an implied obligation
could run to the indemnitee to perform with due care, and to indemnify
for damages flowing from breach of this obligation.
Probably the most troublesome point of difference is between
those cases that permit indemnity when the indemnitee's fault is rela-
tively minor and those that flatly rule out indemnity if the indemnitee
is guilty of any fault at all. The issue is well illustrated by the Florida
opinion in Florida Power & Light Co. v. Hercules Concrete Pile Co. 257
The court quotes the following Supreme Court statement from the
Prods., Inc., 252 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1958) (applying New Jersey law) (finding no possibility of an
implied agreement to indemnify arising out of the purchase of a solvent); Burrell v. Rodgers, 441
F. Supp. 275 (W.D. Okla. 1977) (applying Oklahoma law); Trammel v. Appalachian Elec. Coop.,
135 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Tenn. 1955); E.B. Wills Co. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. App. 3d 650, 128
Cal. Rptr. 541 (1976); Hilzer v. MacDonald, 454 P.2d 928, 169 Col. 230 (1969); Central ofGa. Ry.
v. Lester, 118 Ga. App. 794, 165 S.E.2d 587 (1968); American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.
v. Mark Eng'g Co., 230 Md. 584, 187 A.2d 864 (1963); Diekevers v. Brekel Inc., 73 Mich. App. 78,
250 N.W.2d 548 (1976); Holly Sugar Corp. v. Union Supply Co., 194 Colo. 316, 572 P.2d 148
(1977) (applying Colorado and Montana law); Outboard Marine Corp. v. Schupbach, 93 Nev.
158, 561 P.2d 450 (1977); Ruvolo v. United States Steel Corp., 139 N.J. Super. 578, 354 A.2d 685
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976), modifying 133 N.J. Super. 362, 336 A.2d 508 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law. Div. 1975) (commenting on problem posed by fact that rule it applied would always result in
complete victory for one or another of the two alleged tortfeasors, but declining, in light of New
Jersey law, to succumb to "seductive reasoning" of Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282
N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972) as way of achieving compromise); Royal Indem. Co. v.
Southern Cal. Petroleum Corp., 67 N.M. 137, 353 P.2d 358 (1960); Sayler v. Holstrum, 239
N.W.2d 276 (N.D. 1976); Montoya v. Greenway Aluminum Co., 10 Wash. App. 630, 519 P.2d 22
(1974).
256. Eg., United States v. Seckinger, 408 F.2d 146, 153 (5th Cir. 1969); Centraal Stikstof
Verkoopkanter v. Walsh Stevedoring Co., 380 F.2d 523, 529 (5th Cir. 1967); Ocean Drilling &
Exploration Co. v. Berry Bros. Oilfield Serv., Inc., 377 F.2d 511, 513 (5th Cir.), ceri. denied, 389
U.S. 849 (1967). See 2A LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 76.43 (a) (1982).
257. 275 F. Supp. 427 (S.D. Fla. 1967).
HeinOnline  -- 7 Workmen's Comp. L. Rev. 428 1983-1984
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW REVIEW
Italia258 opinion:
Where the shipowner is liable to the employees of the stevedoring
company... for failing to supply a vessel and equipment free of
defects, regardless of negligence, we do not think it unfair or unwise
to require the stevedore to indemnify the shipowner for damages sus-
tained as a result of injury-producing equipment supplied by the ste-
vedore in furtherance of its contractual obligations. 259
The district court perceived this as the "underlying basis for the Ryan
doctrine." 260 If by this the court means, as its italics indicate, that the
essence of the Ryan doctrine is that the indemnitee in a Ryan recovery
must be free from negligence, the statement is demonstrably wrong.
Weyerhaeuser had already established beyond all doubt that a ship-
owner could be guilty of some negligence and still recover under
Ryan,261 and the question from that point on became: how much neg-
ligence? Nevertheless, the court goes on:
It therefore appears that if the Ryan doctrine is extended, it would be
extended only in favor of an indemnitee who has been held liable
without fault, based on some concept of strict liability such as unsea-
worthiness. However, here as in the Ocean Drilling case, the plain-
tiff's liability to Rita Ahearn could not have been based on liability
without fault. On the contrary, as plaintiff points out, its liability was
based on its own negligence, even though it chooses to characterize
that negligence as "passive. ' '262
What is really at stake here is the distinction between an indemni-
tee who has become liable without fault in any real sense, and an in-
demnitee who has become liable on the basis of a degree of fault that is
relatively much less than that of the indemnitor. Practically all author-
ities, including texts and restatements, would agree that, if the indemni-
tee has become liable on purely technical or vicarious grounds, his
constructive "fault" should not bar his right of indemnity against one
who has saddled him with liability through genuinely tortious con-
duct.263 This would include an indemnitee made liable, for example,
solely by an automobile owner's liability statute,264 or by a nondelega-
ble duty with respect to the condition of premises.265 Difficulty arises
when the fault of the indemnitee moves from "constructive" or "techni-
car' to "passive" or "secondary." It is submitted that much of the diffi-
258. Italia Societa per Azioni di Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedoring, 376 U.S. 315 (1964).
259. 275 F.Supp. at 430, citing Italia, 376 U.S. at 324 (emphasis added).
260. 275 F.Supp. at 430.
261. See Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. Nacirema Operating Co., 372 U.S. 597, 602 (1963).
262. 275 F.Supp at 430.
263. See PROSSER, TORTS § 51 at 311 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION §§ 76,95
(1937).
264. See text accompanying notes 124-26 supra.
265. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 95, Comment a (1937).
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culty can be avoided by eschewing the use of vague adjectival
descriptions like "passive" and sticking to the familiar factual interplay
between creation of a danger and failure to discover it. It is difficult to
see why there should be any insuperable conceptual obstacle to saying
that when the employer negligently creates a dangerous condition in
performing a service for the third party, he should indemnify the third
party even if the third party was negligent to the extent of failing to
discover the danger. It must always be borne in mind that we are here
talking about a contractual relation. This helps to expose the sharp
difference between the two forms of default. It is relatively .easy to say
that one contracting to perform services agrees not to create dangerous
conditions. It is much harder to say that one accepting and paying for
such services agrees that he will discover any dangerous conditions cre-
ated by the contractor.
VII. NONCONTRACTUAL INDEMNITY
Up to this point, the genesis of the relation between the employer
and the third party has been either a contract or a special relationship,
such as that of bailee or bailor, that carries with it an established set of
legal rights and duties. The final combination to be examined is that in
which there is no contractual or special relation, the simplest illustra-
tion being that of a collision between strangers. If the form of the re-
covery-over by the third party against the employer sounds in tort, as in
a claim for contribution, the near-universal case-law rule, as noted ear-
lier,266 bars the action under the exclusive-remedy principle. There re-
mains the question whether, by clothing his claim in the form of
indemnity, the third party can surmount the exclusiveness barrier.
A. Summary of Case Law.
The third-party plaintiff here has not one hurdle but two to leap.
He must first establish that the law implies an agreement by the pri-
mary tortfeasor to indemnify the secondary. But even if he can do this,
the harder task remains: he must show that this liability, even if con-
tractual in form, is not on account of the injury. The final result of this
dual obstacle is clear: the great majority of cases hold that, when the
relationship between the parties does not spring from a contract or spe-
cial position such as bailee or lessee, the third party cannot recover
indemnity from the employer.267 The usual reason is that an active or
266. See text accompanying notes 19-20 supra.
267. Santisteven v. Dow Chem. Co., 506 F.2d 1216 (9th Cir. 1974) (applying Nevada law);
Kessler v. Bowie Mach. Works, 501 F.2d 617 (8th Cir. 1974); Smith Petroleum Serv. v. Monsanto
HeinOnline  -- 7 Workmen's Comp. L. Rev. 430 1983-1984
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW REVIEW
primary wrongdoer does not have an implied obligation, capable of
penetrating the exclusiveness rule of workmen's compensation law, to
indemnify a passive or secondary wrongdoer. Several jurisdictions,
however, have reached a contrary conclusion.268
In the leading case establishing the majority rule,2 69 Judge
Learned Hand gave the following reason for the holding:
[W]e shall assume that, when the indemnitor and indemnitee are.
both liable to the injured person, it is the law of New Jersey that,
regardless of any other relation between them, the difference in grav-
ity of their faults may be great enough to throw the whole loss upon
one. We cannot, however, agree that result is rationally possible ex-
cept upon the assumption that both parties are liable to the same
person for the joint wrong. If so, when one of the two is not so liable,
Chem. Co., 420 F.2d 1103 (5th Cir. 1970) (applying Mississippi law); General Elec. Co. v. Cuban
Am. Nickel Co., 396 F.2d 89 (5th Cir. 1968) (applying Louisiana law); Ocean Drilling & Explora-
tion Co. v. Berry Bros. Oilfield Serv., 377 F.2d 511 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 849 (1967)
(applying Louisiana law); United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. dis-
missed, 379 U.S. 951 (1964); Halliburton Co. v. Norton Drilling Co., 302 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1962);
Bertone v. Turco Prod., Inc., 252 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1958) (applying New Jersey law); Crawford v.
Pope & Talbot, Inc., 206 F.2d 784 (3d Cir. 1953); American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Matthews, 182
F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1950); Belcher v. J.H. Fletcher & Co., 498 F. Supp. 629 (S.D. W. Va. 1980)
(applying West Virginia law); Oman v. Johns-Manville Corp., 482 F. Supp. 1060 (E.D. Va. 1980),
afd sub nom. White v. Johns-Manville Corp., 662 F.2d 243 (4th Cir. 1981) (applying Virginia
law); Roy v. Star Chopper Co., 442 F. Supp. 1010 (D.R.I. 1977), aff'd, 584 F.2d 1124 (1st Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 916 (1979) (applying Massachusetts law); Ranta v, Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 287 F. Supp. 111 (D. Conn. 1968) (applying Connecticut law); Howard v. Wilson Concrete
Co., 57 F.R.D. 8 (W.D. Mo. 1972); Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 356
So. 2d 1203 (Ala. 1978); Golden Valley Elec. Ass'n v. City Elec. Serv., 518 P.2d 65 (Alaska 1974);
Desert Steel Co. v. Superior Court, 22 Ariz. App. 279, 526 P.2d 1077 (1974); Jack Morgan Constr.
Co. v. Larkan, 254 Ark. 838, 496 S.W.2d 431 (1973); Hilzer v. MacDonald, 169 Colo. 230, 454 P.2d
928 (1969); Howard, Needles, Tammen & Bergendoff v. Steers, Perini & Pomeroy, 312 A.2d 621
(Del. 1973); Houdaille Indus. v. Edwards, 374 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 1979); Central of Ga. Ry. v. Lester,
118 Ga. App. 794, 165 S.E.2d 587 (1968); Iowa Power & Light Co. v. Abild Constr. Co., 259 Iowa
314, 144 N.W.2d 303 (1966); McCleskey v. Noble Corp., 2 Kan. App. 2d 240, 577 P.2d 830 (1978);
Roberts v. American Chain & Cable Co., 259 A.2d 43 (Me. 1969); Outboard Marine Corp. v.
Schubpach, 93 Nev. 158, 561 P.2d 450 (1977) (approving the interpretation of the Nevada act by
the Federal courts in Santisteven); William H. Field Co. v. Nuroco Woodwork, Inc., 115 N.H. 632,
348 A.2d 716 (1975); Ruvolo v. United States Steel Corp., 139 N.J. Super. 578, 354 A.2d 685 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976); Hunsucker v. High Point Bending & Chair Co., 237 N.C. 559, 75
S.E.2d 768 (1953); Sayler v. Holstrom, 239 N.W.2d 276 (N.D. 1976); Williams v. Ashland Chem.
Corp., 52 Ohio App. 2d 81, 368 N.E.2d 304 (1976); Harter Concrete Prods., Inc. v. Harris, 592 P.2d
526 (Okla. 1979); Boldman v. Mt. Hood Chem. Corp., 288 Or. 121, 602 P.2d 1072 (1979); Rupe v.
Durbin Durco, Inc., 557 S.W.2d 742 (Tenn. App. 1976); City of Abilene v. Jones, 355 S.W.2d 597
(Tex. Civ. App. 1962); Seattle-First Nat'l. Bank v. Shoreline Concrete Co., 91 Wash. 2d 230, 588
P.2d 1308 (1978); A.O. Smith Corp. v. Associated Sales & Bag Co., 16 Wis. 2d 145, 113 N.W.2d
562 (1962); Mulder v. Acme-Cleveland Corp., 95 Wis.2d 173, 290 N.W.2d 276 (1980).
268. Miller v. De Witt, 37 IU.2d 273, 226 N.E.2d 630 (1967); Ashland Oil & Refining Co. v.
General Tel. Co., 462 S.W.2d 190 (Ky. 1970); Dale v. Whiteman, 388 Mich. 698, 202 N.W.2d 797
(1972); Westchester Lighting Co. v. Westchester County Small Estates Corp., 278 N.Y. 175, 15
N.E.2d 567 (1938).
269. Slattery v. Marra Bros., 186 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1951).
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the right of the other to indemnity must be found in rights and liabil-
ities arising out of some other legal transaction between the two.2 70
Note that, as to the two hurdles, Judge Hand does not concern himself
with the first. He assumes for the sake of argument that the third-party
plaintiff could overcome it in New Jersey, since in any case the second
hurdle, the exclusiveness bar, is insurmountable. In some of the cases,
the first issue-whether there is any implied obligation of indemnity at
all-is treated at more length. The results vary, but the final outcome is
usually the same: the action fails. For this reason, there is little occa-
sion for an extended discussion of the extent to which different states
accept the fiction of an implied agreement by one wrongdoer to reim-
burse a lesser wrongdoer when the latter is forced to pay the
damages.27'
B. Relation between Noncontractual Indemnity, Contractual
Indemnity, and Contribution.
In GeneralElectric Co. v. Cuban American Nickel Co. ,272 for exam-
ple, Judge Wisdom examines with great thoroughness the state of Loui-
siana law on this point and concludes that in that jurisdiction the
distinction is between, not active and passive negligence, but actual and
constructive fault. But in either case, the action would be barred, since
its origin lies in the breach of a duty owed by the employer to the em-
ployee. In other words, the same kind of "common liability" which is a
condition precedent to recovery of contribution by one tortfeasor
against another is also a condition precedent to recovery of indemnity
by a secondary from a primary wrongdoer. And there can be no such
common liability, because the employer's liability to the employee,
which is a special and exclusive liability under the compensation act,
cannot be a liability in common with the third party's liability.
Indeed, this class of cases is not so much different from the ordi-
nary contribution cases as might at first appear. The fiction of implied
promise can be applied just as readily to ordinary contribution between
tortfeasors as to indemnity between primary and secondary tortfeasors,
and has indeed been used in some jurisdictions as the theoretical justifi-
cation for contribution. While this theory is unnecessary to account for
270. Id. at 139.
271. For a discussion of this fiction, see WOODWARD, THE LAW OF QUASI-CONTRACTS § 259,
(1913).
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that, when one person's guilt consists of
creating a dangerous condition, and the other's consists only of failing to discover it, the former's
negligence is primary and subjects him to this indemnity obligation. Union Stockyards Co. v.
Chicago, B. & 0. Ry., 196 U.S. 217, 222 (1905).
272. 396 F.2d 89 (5th Cir. 1968) (applying Louisiana law).
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contribution, 273 it would, in jurisdictions where it is accepted, support
an argument that contribution can be demanded of the employer by the
third party with just as much reason as indemnity, if both are based on
the fiction of a separate obligation running from the employer to the
third party.
The attempt to assert noncontractual indemnity often occurs in
cases in which the relation between the employer and third party is
indeed contractual at base. Here its role is that of "second string to the
bow" of the third-party plaintiff. In such cases, however, it has never
added anything to the third party's case. If he has failed to establish a
Ryan-type indemnity running with the contract, it is not surprising that
he has fared no better in trying to extract a noncontractual indemnity
from the same facts. On the other hand, in one or two cases courts
have begun by finding that the facts in the case would support a com-
mon-law right of indemnity on the active-passive negligence theory,
but then, finding that route blocked by the exclusive-remedy clause,
have gone on to say that the same facts would also support an implied
contractual warranty of the Ryan type not barred by the act.274
In some cases there is no contract whatsoever between the parties.
Thus, in United Air Lines, Inc. v. Weiner275 there was simply an air
collision and in City of,4bilene v. Jones,276 an automobile-tractor colli-
sion. There may also be a contractual relation of sorts, but not one
along which an implied obligation can travel, or at least not travel in
the necessary direction. In Bertone v. Turco Products, Inc. ,277 the third
party was the manufacturer and the employer the purchaser of a dan-
gerous solvent. If the positions had been reversed, a separate implied
duty running with the goods might have been found. But when a pur-
chaser buys a product, does he make an implied contract with the man-
ufacturer to use the goods in such a way as not to bring liability upon
the manufacturer? This would be stretching the concept of contract out
of all relation to reality. The court's approach to the matter assumed
that the employer's duty to the manufacturer, if any, would have to be
one based on its relative negligence, and on that basis the duty could
not survive the exclusive-liability clause.278
273. Camp v. Bostwick, 20 Ohio St. 337 (1870).
274. American President Lines, Ltd. v. Marine Terminals Corp., 234 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1956);
McDonnell Aircraft Corp. v. Hartman-Hanks-Walsh Painting Co., 323 S.W.2d 788 (Mo. 1939).
275. 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 951 (1964).
276. 355 S.W.2d 597 (rex. Civ. App. 1962).
277. 252 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1958) (applying New Jersey law).
278. Id. at 728-29.
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A similar attempt to make a manufacturer's warranty relationship
operate in reverse was thwarted inA. 0. Smith Corp. v. Associated Sales
& Bag Co. 279 Here the manufacturer of an apron, bought by the em-
ployer from a supplier, was ultimately held liable for injuries to the
employee when the apron caught fire. The manufacturer attempted to
recover over against the employer on the ground that the employer was
negligent in letting the employee use the apron. The action was held
barred, since the employer could not be found jointly liable with the
manufacturer in tort.
A contrary result on comparable facts was achieved by the New
York Court of Appeals in Dole v. Dow Chemical Co. 280 but without any
discussion of the precise point here examined. In this case, the plain-
tiff's husband, an employee of Urban Milling Company, had died as a
result of exposure to a poisonous fumigant manufactured by Dow.
Plaintiff sued Dow, charging failure to give users of the fumigant suffi-
cient warning of its danger.281 Dow in turn made claim as a third-party
plaintiff against Urban, alleging negligent failure to follow precautions
on the label and in the accompanying literature, use of untrained per-
sonnel for this work, and failure to air out the premises properly after
fumigation.282 The court of appeals held that Dow's claim would lie,
and could be tried either separately or together with the widow's case,
in the discretion of the court.283 The main innovation of the holding,
and the one that has made it one of the most important tort cases in
New York's history, was the abandonment of the "active-passive" neg-
ligence test in determining whether indemnification will be allowed in
such cases, and the launching of a new rule that the right to indemnity
"should rest on relative responsibility and may be apportioned on the
facts."'284 As to the issue of exclusiveness of the compensation remedy,
the court merely equated this indemnity situation 285 with that in West-
chester Lighting Co. v. Westchester Small Estates Corp. 286
The relative responsibility of the employer and the chemical com-
pany for the wrongful death of the employee would be determined
only in the action by the chemical company in which the cause as-
serted is based on a separate legal entity of rights to be adjudicated
279. 16 Wis.2d 145, 113 N.W.2d 562 (1962).
280. 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972). See text accompanying notes
62-67 supra for a discussion of other aspects of the case.
281. Id. at 145-46, 282 N.E.2d at 290, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 384-85.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 153, 282 N.E.2d at 294, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 391.
284. Id. at 153, 282 N.E.2d at 295, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 391-92.
285. Id. at 152, 282 N.E.2d at 294, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 390.
286. 278 N.Y. 175, 15 N.E.2d 567 (1938).
HeinOnline  -- 7 Workmen's Comp. L. Rev. 434 1983-1984
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW REVIEW
from the action by the administratrix against it (Schubert v. Schubert
Wagon Co., 249 N.Y. 253).
The theoretical difficulties have been resolved for this court by
Westchester Lighting Co. v. Westchester County Small Estates Corp.
(278 N.Y. 175, supra) which sustained the right of plaintiff, a utility
which had been found negligent in an action for causing the death of
defendant's employee, to sue the employer on indemnity for having
directly and negligently caused the death which in turn had corn-.
pelled plaintiff to pay damages in an action by the employee's estate.
The difference between the causes of action and the parties pur-
suing them was decisive. "Plaintiff does not sue for damages on
acount of' Haviland's death. Plaintiff asserts its own right of recov-
ery for breach of an alleged independent duty or obligation owed to
it by the defendant (opn. by Loughran, J., P. 179).
That is a precise description of Dow's third-party claim here.287
The court does not appear to have been troubled by the fact that
the "independent duty" in Westchester was itself based on the obliga-
tion of a primary tortfeasor to indemnify a secondary tortfeasor-a dis-
tinction the court had just been at some pains to demolish. Under
Dole, apparently every joint tortfeasor has a quasi-contractual obliga-
tion to reimburse every other joint tortfeasor regardless of degree of
fault. Indeed, it would seem to follow that a secondary or passive
tortfeasor has such a duty to indemnify a primary or active tortfeasor.
In any event, the court never addressed itself to the more stubborn diffi-
culty that such a "duty" would not be "independent," since it arises out
of the injury itself, and is "on account of' the injury, even if cast in
indemnity terms. The "independent duty" in Dole could not very well
be held to be based on contract, although there was a contract between
the parties. The contract was simply one of sale-in this instance, of a
poisonous fumigant. Clearly certain independent obligations run with
the sale from the manufacturer to the buyer. But it seems unlikely that
the court of appeals would be prepared to hold that an independent
contractual obligation runs from the buyer to the manufacturer. To do
this the court would have to announce the following doctrine: "When-
ever a buyer purchases an article from a manufacturer, the buyer as-
sumes an independent contractual obligation to the manufactuer not to
use the article in such a way as to bring liability on the manufactuer."
There is very little authority for this proposition, 28 and there is a
287. 30 N.Y.2d at 152, 282 N.E.2d at 294, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 390.
288. See Ham v. Standard Eng'g Co., 416 F. Supp. 1168 (D.S.D. 1976) (applying South Da-
kota law); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Kaiser Gypsum Co., 273 Or. 162, 539 P.2d 1065
(1975).
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large and growing body of authority to the contrary.2 9 As an Ohio
court said, in a typical chemicals case:
The mere fact that a product has been sold by a vendor to a vendee
does not per se make the vendee of the product primarily liable and
the vendor secondarily liable, and thereby establish an implied con-
tract indemnity running in favor of the vendor.
Pertinent to this point, the following statement is to be found in
the decision of McClish v. Niagara Machine & Tool Works, supra, 266
F. Supp. at page 991: '***[W]hen the sole contractual relationship
between the parties is merely that arising out of a fully executed sales
contract, the warranties run from the manufacturer to the purchaser
and ultimate users, and not the reverse.*** '29°
In summary: when the relation between the parties involves no
contract or special relation capable of carrying with it an implied obli-
gation to indemnify, the basic exclusiveness rule generally cannot be
defeated by dressing the remedy itself in contractual clothes, such as
indemnity, since what governs is not the delictual or contractual form
of the remedy but the question: is the claim "on account of' the injury,
or on account of a separate obligation running from the employer to
the third party?
VIII. POLICY ARGUMENTS AND MERITS OF VARIOUS SOLUTIONS
In evaluating the rich and rapidly-changing array of solutions, ac-
tual or proposed, to this "most evenly-balanced" problem, there are at
289. Steinmetz v. Bradbury Co., 618 F.2d 21 (8th Cir. 1980) (no implied obligation under
Iowa law running from the purchaser of machinery to the manufacturer to idemnify the manufac-
turer for the purchaser's failure to instruct his employee in the safe operation of the machine;
accordingly, manufacturer could not cross-claim for indemnity from the employer, who had paid
compensation to the injured worker, the plaintiff in a products liability suit); Santisteven v. Dow
Chem. Co., 506 F.2d 1216 (9th Cir. 1974); Bertone v. Turco Prods., Inc., 252 F.2d 726 (3d Cir.
1958); Hill Lines, Inc. v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 222 F.2d 854 (10th Cir. 1955) (applying New
Mexico law); Halstead v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 236 F. Supp. 182 (S.D. W.Va. 1964) (applying West
Virginia law), aft'dsub nonr. Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Anderson's Black Rock, Inc., 350 F.2d 917 (4th
Cir. 1965); Therrien v. Safeguard Mfg. Co., 180 Conn. 91, 429 A.2d 808 (1980), aff'g 35 Conn.
Supp. 268, 408 A.2d 273 (1979) (employer cannot be impleaded in worker's suit against a manu-
facturer of safety equipment; the buyer of equipment has no duty to the seller); Cordier v. Stetson-
Ross, Inc., 604 P.2d 86 (Mont. 1979); Vangreen v. Interstate Mach. and Supply Co., 197 Neb. 29,
246 N.W.2d 652 (1976); Outboard Marine Corp. v. Schupbach, 93 Nev. 158, 561 P.2d 450 (1977)
(approving the interpretation of the Nevada act by the federal courts in Santisteven); Arcell v.
Ashland Chem. Co., 152 N.J. Super. 471, 378 A.2d 53 (1977); Ruvolo v. United States Steel Corp.,
139 N.J. Super. 578, 354 A.2d 685 (1976), modfying 133 N.J. Super. 362, 336 A.2d 508 (1975);
Williams v. Ashland Chem. Co., 52 Ohio App. 2d 81, 368 N.E.2d 304 (1976); Boldman v. Mt.
Hood Chem. Corp., 288 Or. 121, 602 P.2d 1072 (1979); Olch v. Pacific Press & Sheer Co., 19 Wash.
App. 89, 573 P.2d 1355 (1978); A.O. Smith Corp. v. Associated Sales & Bag Co., 16 Wis. 2d 145,
113 N.W.2d 562 (1962).
290. Williams v. Ashland Chem. Co., 52 Ohio App. 2d 81, 92, 368 N.E.2d 304, 311 (1976).
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least two quite different approaches. One depends on which party's
interests are favored. The other depends on what values are favored.
A. Solutions Arrayed by Interests Affected
The interests of three parties are inevitably affected by any choice
of solution: the employer, the third party, and the employee.
The most pro-employer solution is to adhere to the traditional
rule, which is to bar any recovery-over against the employer on either
contribution2 9' or implied indemnity,292 while also retaining the em-
ployer's lien on the third-party recovery to the extent of compensation
payments, without regard to the employer's fault. This is definitely the
majority decisional rule, and has if anything been increasing in
strength, with states like Connecticut, Colorado, Oregon, North Da-
kota, Utah, Virginia and Wisconsin being recently added to an already
one-sided list. In the lively products-liability area, a similarly lopsided
majority rejects the idea of a separate duty of care running upstream
from buyer to manufacturer that would support an independent obliga-
tion of indemnity.293 The primary-secondary wrongdoer source of im-
plied indemnity has also faded noticeably, the most conspicuous
evidence being the disavowal of Kittleson by Iowa in Abild,294 and
again by the Eighth Circuit in Hysel. 295 Several statutes have also
moved in this direction, or tried to. The Longshoremen's 1972 Amend-
ments went the furthest, invalidating even express warranties as a basis
for indemnity.296 The Minnesota 297 and Florida 298 statutes were held
unconstitutional, but Florida seems to have ended with roughly the
same result by judicial decision.299 Pennsylvania's amendment survived
intact.3°0 Illinois reasserted the requirement of joint tort liability as a
291. See, e.g., Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282 (1952);
Newport Air Park, Inc. v. United States, 419 F.2d 342 (lst Cir. 1969); Murray v. United States, 405
F.2d 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
292. See, e.g., Kudelka v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 541 F.2d 651 (7th Cir. 1976); Gen-
eral Elec. Co. v. Cuban Am. Nickel Co., 396 F.2d 89 (5th Cir. 1968); Hilzer v. MacDonald, 454
P.2d 928 (Colo. 1969).
293. See notes 288-90 supra and accompanying text.
294. Iowa Power & Light Co. v. Abild Constr. Co., 259 Iowa 314, 324, 144 N.W.2d 303, 309
(1966).
295. 534 F.2d 775 (8th Cir. 1976).
296. See text accompanying notes 146-47 supra.
297. Carlson v. Smogard, 298 Minn. 362, 215 N.W. 2d 615 (1974) (considering MiNN. STAT.
ANN. § 176.061(10) (West 1960)).
298. Sunspan Eng'g & Constr. Co. v. Spring-Lock Scaffolding Co., 310 So.2d 4 (Fla. 1975)
(considering FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 440.11, 440.11(1) (West 1963)).
299. Hondaille Indus. v. Edwards, 374 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 1979).
300. Tsarnas v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 488 Pa. 513, 412 A.2d 1094 (1980).
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condition precedent to contribution.301
As to pro-third-party solutions: the Illinois30 2 and New York303
judicial creations go the furthest of any, providing unlimited recovery-
over in the form of contribution in Illinois until the 1979 amendment,
and of indemnity in New York. If we included theoretical solutions,
the most extreme would be the complete abolition of third-party ac-
tions, discussed later.304
Between these extremes are the types of compromise solutions that
allow recovery-over limited to the amount of the employer's compensa-
tion liability. This was the compromise first essayed by the Third Cir-
cuit in Baccile,305 then by Pennsylvania3 6 until abolished by legislative
amendment,30 7 and most recently by Minnesota.30 8 The same end re-
sult was attempted by North Carolina30 9 and California,310 through the
device of reducing the employee's third-party recovery by the amount
of compensation, a device which, in California at any rate, proved to be
anything but the simple short-cut it was intended to be.31'
Up to this point, the employee's ultimate interests have not been
affected. When we sort out the various approaches, actual or proposed,
according to impact on the employee's rights, we again encounter an
extreme spread. Most favorable to the employee is double recovery-
keeping both his third-party award and his compensation-as is possi-
ble in several states,312 including Ohio and West Virginia. Then comes
the normal rule, in which the employee comes out even, in the sense
that he ends with roughly the full amount of the third-party damages
and no more.313 Less favorable to the employee in most instances
would be the "Murray credit rule," 314 in which his third-party recovery
301. See notes 68-77 supra and accompanying text.
302. See note 68 supra.
303. See notes 280-87 supra and accompanying text.
304. See text accompanying notes 319 and 321 infra.
305. 187 F.2d 403 (3d Cir. 1951), rev'd sub nont on other grounds, Halcyon Lines v. Haenn
Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282 (1952).
306. See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
307. See note 30 supra.
308. See note 36 supra.
309. See Hunsucker v. High Point Bending & Chair Co., 237 N.C. 559, 75 S.E.2d 768 (1953).
310. See Witt v. Jackson, 57 Cal.2d 57, 366 P.2d 641, 17 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1961); Tate v.
Superior Court, 213 Cal. App. 2d 238, 28 Cal. Rptr. 548 (1963); Pacific Indem. Co. v. California
Elec. Works, 29 Cal. App. 2d 260, 84 P.2d 813 (1938); CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. §§ 875-880 (West
1957). See also A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §§ 75.21-22 (1982).
311. See A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 75.22 (1982).
312. Id. § 74.11.
313. Id. § 71.20.
314. See notes 49-61 supra and accompanying text.
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would be reduced by half if the employer was negligent-a solution
that has attracted no acceptance.
Another interesting attempt to grapple with the same problem is
that of Professor Clifford Davis in a 1976 article.315 His proposal is
that the relative percentage of fault of the employer and of the third
party should first be calculated. This percentage should then be ap-
plied to the level of benefits or damages of the respective systems. 316
The third-party defendant thus would be liable for no more than the
damage verdict multiplied by his percentage of fault. The employer,
when subrogation occurs, would be liable for the compensation benefit
multiplied by his percentage of fault. If the total damages were
$10,000, the compensation liability $2,500, and the employer and third
party each 50% negligent, the third party would be liable to the em-
ployee for $5,000; the employer's reimbursement would be reduced by
50% of $2,500, or $1,250; and the employee would end up with $6,250.
Professor Davis also examines some of the difficulties of and objections
in the path of this solution, but concludes that this course is within the
bounds of practical possibility.
Other commentators, coming at the matter from the products lia-
bility angle, remind us that the familiar rules limiting the range of im-
mune third parties, as well as the earliest doctrines prohibiting
recovery-over by third parties against employers, were not built up in
products liability cases. The argument is increasingly heard that these
conventional doctrines need to be reexamined in the light of the new
issue of how the impact of products liability can be most equitably,
practically, and efficiently handled as a part of the total loss-sharing
process. Professor Jeffrey O'Connell's proposed solution is the negotia-
tion between employers and unions of agreements under which em-
ployees waive their rights to sue certain third-party suppliers.317 He
deals at some length with the obvious question of why employees
would ever embrace such a bargain, as well as with the many other
issues of labor law, constitutional law, and the like, that such a plan
would encounter. The main thrust of his argument is that so much of
the product-liability dollar is consumed in expenses and fees that the
worker would be better off to agree to other uses of the money, perhaps
in higher compensation benefits.318
315. Davis, Third-Party Tortfeasors'Rights Where Compensation-Covered Employers are Negli-
gent-Where do Dole and Sunspan Lead?, 4 HoFSTvRA L. REv. 571 (1976).
316. Id. 580.
317. O'Connell, Bargainingfor Waivers of Third-Party Tort Claimns:An Answer to Product Lia-
biltp Woesfor Employers and their Employees and Suppliers, 1976 U. OF ILL. L. F. 435.
318. Id. 440-42.
HeinOnline  -- 7 Workmen's Comp. L. Rev. 439 1983-1984
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW REVIEW
The most extreme proposal, from the employee's point of view, is
that his third-party suits be-not negotiated away-but abolished, as
urged by Professor Bernstein.319 Again, as with O'Connell's sugges-
tion, a quidpro quo is envisioned, in the form of a fund, provided by
third parties supplementing present compensation sources, to increase
compensation benefits, especially for serious injuries, and also possibly
to provide cost-of-living increases. The fund would be increased by
contributions at rates related to the third parties' injury-causing history.
Subrogation would also be abolished. The abolition of third-party ac-
tions and subrogation was also the program of the "Special Committee
on Workplace Liability Reform," formed in 1977 and headed by for-
mer Senator Taft. It similarly assumed an improvement in compensa-
tion benefits, but, unlike Bernstein, did not build them directly into the
plan. Curiously, the United States Chamber of Commerce opposed the
plan.
B. Solutions Arrayed by Values Served.
In the world of everyday law, by contrast with the world of ab-
stract ethics, decisions often involve the balancing of values other than
pure equity-even if pure equity could be discovered. A legal system
must have some element of consistency and predictability, which
means that it cannot necessarily be swayed by whatever seems to be the
fairest result from one moment to the next. Moreover, a legal system
must be administrable, in the sense that it must be able to translate
concepts of justice into decisions of actual cases involving an almost
infinite variety of complications. And so, in an issue as close as the one
we are dealing with, choice of a solution will ultimately depend on the
relative weight given to three competing values: stability, equity, and
simplicity.
Most courts have chosen the course which respects the value of
stability; that is, they have adhered to several time-honored doctrines:
the rule of exclusiveness of the employer's compensation liability and
his right to reimbursement for his compensation outlay; the rule that
contribution between joint tortfeasors requires joint tort liability; the
rule that a fictional indemnity obligation will not be implied because of
varying degrees of fault of tortfeasors, and that even if it were, it would
still be "on account of the injury"; and the rule that a separate duty of
care does not run "upstream" from a purchaser to a manufacturer of a
product. A clear illustration of the deliberate honoring of the value of
319. Bemstein, Third Party Claims in Workers' Compensation: A Proposal to Do More with
Less, 1977 WAsH. U.L.Q. 543.
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stability may be seen in the decisions of the Supreme Court of New
Jersey in Schweizer v. Elox Division of Colt Industries,320 as it refused to
emulate the North Carolina-California approach, and the Superior
Court of New Jersey in Ruvolo v. U.S. Steel Corp.,321 as it similarly
refused to emulate the New York Dole solution. The Supreme Court
of New Jersey observed in Schweizer that it would be inappropriate at
this late date to make drastic judicial changes in a "carefully articu-
lated scheme of adjustment 32 2 of the relative rights of all the parties
that had stood for sixty years without legislative alteration.323
When courts have decided to elevate fairness above all other con-
siderations, including stability, the result has usually been to propor-
tion the ultimate liability of employer and third party to their relative
fault, as in New York 324 and, until 1979, in Illinois.325 Appealing as
this is at first blush, it is subject to question in at least three respects-
leaving aside the damage done to the concept of stare decisis, which the
courts in these instances plainly felt was outweighed by the injustice
being perpetuated. The first observation is that the New York-Illinois
approach gives no weight to the factor of the employer's traditional
immunity to liability beyond his compensation obligation. In other
words, fairness is appraised as if between two equal strangers, ignoring
the fact that one, the employer, has already made concessions and as-
sumed liabilities to the employee, for which his immunity was the quid
pro quo. The Minnesota formula at least recognizes this factor and
attempts to do something about it, by placing an absolute ceiling on the
employer's liability in the amount of his compensation liability.326 It is
thus possible to say that the employer, in the end, pays out no more
than he expected to under the compensation act. The second comment
is that fairness, in this context, is even more elusive than usual, because
it involves a complete mix of different kinds of fault--some real moral
fault, some merely fictitious, vicarious or technical. The employer's
fault is usually not personal but vicarious; the third party's fault is often
virtually absolute, as in unseaworthiness, products liability, automobile
owner's liability, and the like. It is no wonder that a strange kind of
balancing of fault often results, when the fault being balanced is no-
fault on both sides. The third criticism is that the price of equity will
inevitably be the sacrifice of the third value-simplicity. Litigation will
320. 70 N.J. 280, 286, 359 A.2d 857, 860 (1976).
321. 139 N.J. Super. 578, 587, 354 A.2d 685, 690 (1976).
322. 70 N.J. at 286-87, 359 A.2d at 860-61.
323. Id.
324. See text accompanying notes 62-67 supra.
325. See text accompanying notes 68-77 supra.
326. See notes 36-38 supra and accompanying text.
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be complicated. It would appear that all three parties will have to be
involved in practically all cases, with percentage assessments of fault
for each. The Illinois rule was too recent and short-lived to permit
examples of these complications to appear, but the proliferation of
post-Dole New York cases is not encouraging. 327
C. Suggested Solution Maximizing Simplicity.
There is a possible solution, not in effect anywhere, that would
achieve maximum simplicity without, perhaps, too shocking a depar-
ture from equity. It is a sort of adaptation of the North Carolina-Cali-
fornia approach, with some important alterations designed in part to
avoid the appalling complexities that bedeviled the California courts
after Witt v. Jackson.328 First, reduce the employee's recovery against
the third party by the amount of compensation in all cases, not just in
those involving employer negligence. And, of course, the employee
keeps his compensation, thus coming out whole. Note that one enor-
mous complication has already been eliminated-that of determining
the relative fault of employer and third party. Second, abolish subro-
gation in all cases, and of course abolish reimbursement of the em-
ployer by the employee, since the employee has not recovered the
equivalent of his compensation from the third party. The great advan-
tage here is that the employer and his carrier are simply out of the
third-party picture altogether. Third, abolish all recovery-over by the
third party.
There is something for everybody in this wholesale compromise,
and this is important both as a matter of fairness and as a matter of
constitutionality. The employee comes out with full damages, with less
complications and delays, and without the possible prejudice to his in-
terests arising from the presence of the employer in the litigation. The
employer, of course, loses some opportunities for reimbursement from
the third party, but in discussions with representative carriers, the
writer has been struck by how relatively little importance they attach to
this factor. By the same token, in jurisdictions in which some kind of
recovery-over by the third party against the employer is possible, the
employer would be relieved of any such possible liability. The third
party in turn, would have his liability reduced below what it is now in
most jurisdictions, and in all jurisdictions in cases in which the em-
ployer was not at fault. In short, there would be only one lawsuit and
327. See A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 76.84 n. 95 (1982).
328. 57 Cal. 2d 57, 366 P.2d 641, 17 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1961). See A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION § 75.22 (1982).
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only one issue: was the third party at fault? The problem that caused
the most difficulty in California is avoided, since it is not necessary to
try the issue of the employer's negligence in the employee's suit against
the third party--or at any other time.3 29
We thus end, not on a confident note of "this is the optimum solu-
tion," but with several choices depending on the values to be served.
At least one unqualified caution will be ventured: the solution should
be based on what is good for compensation law. If products liability
law has got out of hand, the necessary corrections should be made
within the boundaries of products liability law; they should not be
made by distorting long-standing compensation principles completely
out of shape.
Finally, in choosing between the values identified, it is worthwhile
to recall that one of the most important values stressed by the early
founders of workers' compensation was getting rid of the uncertainties
and complications of common-law litigation and substituting simple,
near-automatic remedies. This ideal, as it turned out, was not to be
realized, but at least it can be said that any step in the direction of
simplicity is a step toward one of the oldest and finest traditions of
workers' compensation.
329. See A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 75.22 (1982).
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